The study of the history of religious and secular thought reveals that throughout the ages great philosophers, sages and religious leaders held different views about the comparative values of reason, logic and revelation. As such, they can be divided into various groups.
There are those who emphasize the role of rationality to a degree that they consider it as the only valid means of discovering truth. For them, the only conclusion worthy of acceptance is the one which can be derived through dialectical logical reasoning based on observed facts. Hence, they believe that truth (in whatever form they define it) can only be reached through the faculty of reasoning.
There are thinkers who believe in the phenomenon of Divine guidance which, according to them, plays a definite role in enlightening the human mind, providing it with answers to many unresolved questions.
Again there are those who believe that truth can be reached entirely through inner experiences referred to as ‘inspiration’. They consider it to be attainable through a deep search within oneself, as if its blueprint had been imprinted upon every human soul. They delve deep within themselves, and through an introspective study attain a fundamental understanding of nature and how it works.
Another mode of reaching truth shared both by the religious and secular schools of enquiry is mysticism. Mystification of life seems to be a common tendency shared by believers and non-believers alike. Mystics may belong to all the categories mentioned above and their methodology could be philosophical or religious. Their distinguishing mark is that they enjoy being cryptic.
Then there are pseudo-philosophers who use words and phrases that are too elusive for the common man to understand. Thus they hide their views behind the mystic screen of their verbosity. There are others however, who have truly scientific minds but are mystics all the same, as were Pythagoras and Averroes. They burrow deep in search of the seed of truth and do not remain content with hovering on the surface of things. To keep track of them with concentration of mind is always rewarding.
In religion, we find mystics of different hues and colours. There are those who, whilst accepting and fulfilling the outward observances required by the form of religion, strive to find deeper meaning below the surface. Also, there are some who overemphasize the inner meaning at the cost of the external form, sometimes doing away with the observances altogether.
But followers of religions founded upon revelation do not always remain confined to discussions within the boundaries of revelational truths. In the later stages of each religion we also find such debates, as are difficult to be defined as entirely religious in nature. The same age-old questions are again revived within a new framework. What is reason? What part does it play in human affairs, and where does revelation stand in relation to logic and reason?
It is universally observed that the interplay of various ideas at later stages of a religion’s history tends to revert to the confusion which prevailed prior to their advent. It happens because man’s influence on religion has always been to break it into factions and to partially revert it to the older mythical ideas and philosophies. It has seldom led to a reunification of differing schools of thought born through the degenerating processes that divide and split religions. This degeneration seems to be irreversible.
Religions which begin with the firm faith in the Unity of God, gradually decay into numerous idolatrous schisms. There are occasional attempts made by man to reconstitute the unity of religious understanding among the people and to re-establish the Unity of God. Alas, such efforts gain only limited success. As a whole, the process is never reversed, unless it is Divinely aided and guided.
We cannot discuss here in detail all the varying views propounded by past philosophers and sages, but we shall give a brief account of the assessment of revelation, rationality and their interrelationship made by various prominent intellectuals of the past.
What is eternal truth, and what is knowledge? What is the relationship, if any, between the two? Does revelation provide knowledge which in turn leads to eternal truth, or could both be attainable through rationality alone?
These, and many other similar questions have been agitating the minds of philosophers, religious divines and secular thinkers since time immemorial. But before we begin a careful in-depth study, it would be appropriate perhaps to further elaborate the nature of eternal truth as understood by different thinkers.
All believers in God who advocate the cause of eternal truth, understand it to be an unchangeable reality in relation to the past, present and future. As such, primarily, it is to God with His attributes that they refer as Truth Eternal. However, when secular philosophers discuss the same issue, they do not always discuss it in relation to God. Their discussion generally revolves around certain values such as truth, honesty, integrity, faith, loyalty etc. The prime question which agitates the minds of the philosophers is whether there exists any unchangeable reality even in the face of changeable circumstances. The merit of a given truth itself is many a time challenged as such. One often begins to wonder whether truth would not acquire different meanings in different situations.
Another aspect of the same question relates to the concept of truth as applicable to the hidden realities behind the screen of what appears. For instance, if we treat the light of the sun as an independent reality we may be wrong. More than the light itself it is the causative reality of radiation which works behind all its manifestations, light being just one of them. The hidden universal truth is the radiation which may or may not vibrate at the spectrum which humans see as light. From this angle, nothing seems to be eternal about the sun’s luminosity. But if, as suggested above, the reason why the sun radiates is perfectly understood, then wherever that reason is found to be at work, it will produce the same result and as such, it could be referred to as the ‘eternal’ truth which commands the laws of radiation and luminosity. With this illustration it becomes quite evident that the term ‘eternal’ does not always indicate a state of unbroken, unceasing continuity. Here it only applies to a causative phenomenon, which whenever present will always produce the same results.
In this simple understanding of eternal truth, relating to the external realities, the phenomenon of gravity could be rightly referred to as eternal truth. However, it should be well understood that any minute variation in the application of gravitational pull does not in any way challenge the unchangeable fundamental reality of gravity.
It becomes evident from the preceding discussion that although all eternal truths give rise to certain knowledge, all types of knowledge, however, cannot be defined as eternal. Knowledge can be defined as a perception of something which is safely stored in the mind as a reliable piece of information. All such pieces of information put together build a storehouse of human knowledge. How can we gain certain knowledge, and how can we determine which specific knowledge is false and which is true?
Again, by what means can we categorize knowledge as transient truth, substantial truth, eternal truth, conditional truth etc.? It is only the human faculty of reasoning and rationality which ruminates these facts as they are fed into the brain, turns them over and over again and permutates them into various possible combinations. This mental process of sorting out the right from the wrong, the definite from the indefinite, is the mechanism of rationality.
The question arises as to how far this method of analysing the constituents of knowledge is reliable. When we reach this stage of our comprehension of rationality, other intriguing questions also begin to raise their heads. We know, for instance, that the human mind has no consistency in relation to its own findings. We know for certain that whatever is considered rational in one age may not necessarily be considered rational in another. We know, without doubt, that the faculty of reasoning has been progressively developing and maturing ever since man emerged from the domain of the animal kingdom into the world of humans. From that time onward, the collective experience as it is amassed in the form of knowledge and truth in the human mind continued to improve the faculty of his reasoning and the quality of his rational appraisals.
As physical exercise improves muscle power, so also the mental, rational and retentive faculties develop and gain strength with mental exercise. It is this exercise perhaps which may also have contributed to a progressive evolutionary increase in the brain mass of animals.
This realization of the progressive advance of our mental faculties though welcome on one count, is rather unwelcome on another. It puts to question the very reliability of our mental rational deductions during different stages of our development.
Is it not likely that the same facts fed to the human brain at different stages of its development may have resulted in different conclusions? If the objective realities appear different when observed from different vantage points, if the conclusions drawn by the unbiased human mind also differ in different ages, then will it be justified to adjudge them as only justified truths? With our faculties of deductive logic and reasoning alone at any point in time, we cannot pronounce any knowledge we possess to be absolute truth.
The issues we are about to discuss are concerning the instruments which may lead to knowledge and the manner in which any knowledge could be ascertained as truth. If all human vantage points are actually placed on a moving platform, with constant change in the angle of vision, how can any knowledge or piece of information we obtain be declared, with any certainty, to be the truth? There is one vantage point, that of God the Creator, which is eternal and constant. Hence, if the existence of an Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent God is proved and if He is Eternal, Infallible, Transcendent, All-Powerful and Possessor of absolute attributes—then and only then could the possibility of gaining knowledge of eternal truth through Him arise. But this hypothesis is only conditional on the premise that not only does such a Supreme Being exist, but that He also communicates with humans. It is this communication of God with humans which is called revelation in religious terminology.
To discuss issues of such great import, purely on a secular and rational basis is not an easy task. Add to this the question of revelation as having played any significant role in human guidance, and the task will become all the more challenging. Yet this is the task we have undertaken, with the full realization of all the complexities involved.
The reader is most humbly requested to make an effort to remain alert. Once he familiarizes himself with the intricacies of the philosophical and rational jigsaw, he will be amply rewarded with the ultimate pleasure of watching the pieces of this jigsaw fall into the right places.
In application to religion, this view has given birth to a school of sociologists and modem thinkers who consider the birth and development of religion to be a reflection of man’s developing power of reasoning. The implication of this is that man’s comparatively primitive intellect in the remote past led to the creation of many godly images, which, with the passage of time, gave birth to the idea of a single deity, referred to as God, Allah, Parmatma etc. If accepted, this theory would lead to the conclusion that the development of religion at every cross-section of its history corresponded to man’s changing intellectual capabilities.
This is a diametrically opposed view to the one held by various religions of the world, who all believe in the Divine origin of religion. According to this view, religion is directly taught to man by the One, Eternal, All-Wise God. They see polytheism, which dominates many periods of human history, merely as a degenerative process—a process which invariably follows monotheism after it is established by the messengers of God. A further discussion on these issues will follow later.
Nearly all major religions profess belief in an invisible God Who can and does communicate with man. They claim that God chooses human representatives and that the communication they receive from Him is the only dependable means of attaining true knowledge. They maintain that it is not possible to establish any truth with complete certainty, if it is based solely upon man’s experiences and his rational deductions.
All that has been briefly summed up above is addressed more elaborately in the following chapters.
Freedom is a prerogative of all living things, man being no exception. Liberty is the most cherished fruit of life. Man is the epitome of liberty which is ingrained in him. His very texture is woven with the yarn of liberty. Yet, amazingly, we find all man-made institutions shaped to work against the liberty of man in the final analysis.
A careful study of the history of progressive growth of traditions, customs and legislation is sufficient to prove this assertion. The evolution of the state when viewed from an unbiased, detached angle of perception will appear no more than an institutionalized journey of man towards progressive self-imposed slavery. To resolve this dilemma requires a deeper understanding of the factors which are responsible for this step by step transition from freedom to bondage.
One thing must be noted at the outset, that man by nature will bow to the authority of society only when he is driven by selfish motives; otherwise he will have to be coerced into submission. But to socialise is not a prerogative of man alone. As the animal kingdom moves from lower to higher orders, there appears to be a gradual transition from a chaotic to a more disciplined, organized and centralized animal society. Sometimes we notice it as a trend, where necessity must have taught the animals to live together in their common interest of survival. Sometimes, to our utter amazement, we find social order and meticulous discipline ingrained even in such animal species as are not very highly placed in the ladder of evolution. No gradual evolutionary influences can be traced in their highly disciplined order which seem to have erupted as such in their final perfected form. All that we can infer from the study of their institutionalized existence is that it is naturally ingrained in them.
Take for example the case of certain insects. Where would one place in the ladder of evolution the society of honey-bees? What could possibly have preceded them if they had slowly evolved step by step? Where would one find the evidence of a gradual stage-by-stage development of a long line of insects culminating in the creation of honey-bees? Likewise, when we examine the case of termites and some of the other species of ants belonging to the order of insects, we experience similar problems.
Without any trace of gradual evolution, they are all precisely made to perform specific functions with an ingrained discipline which they follow meticulously. With them it is an inviolable law etched upon their RNA and DNA. By comparison they put to shame even the most strictly regimented and disciplined communist societies. They are all exceptional solitary cases of organized creative wonders which show no traceable history of a crude elementary beginning, gradually evolving into higher complex societies.
We can safely conclude from this that life as such offers two types of disciplines for us to study. One appears to be spontaneous, as though born out of nothingness in a sudden outburst of God’s creative wonders. The scientists, however, may refer to it as a host of mutative changes all taking place simultaneously in one single moment. This hypothetical proposition is of course scientifically unentertainable.
The second type of development of social orders in the animal kingdom is much more generalized and progressive in nature; though the results are not so dramatic as the previously mentioned examples. Even dogs and wolves and wildebeests exhibit this positive trend of living together in societies in the interest of class survival. Whatever the reason, we also find a similar trend in the flocking together of birds of the same feather. Likewise shoals of fish, turtles and sea urchins display similar tendencies. This bonding together, therefore, is common to life.
With discipline, authority is born and leadership emerges. A vague precept of crime and punishment begins to creep into the society at every level. For man to have evolved as a social animal, therefore, is not a solitary accident but is in conformity with a predesigned plan of behaviour shared equally by most other animals to a lesser or greater degree.
How the institution of society developed all over the world simultaneously is a question which requires a lengthy discussion. We intend only to deal with a few important features of social development among humans which are directly related to the subject under discussion.
Individual liberty has always been intrinsically at odds with the restraints imposed by society. A deeper understanding of the dilemma presented by this equation is most essential for a better comprehension of the forces which finally determine the boundaries of individual liberty on the one hand and the rising power of the society on the other. Individual-family relationship, individual-clan relationship and individual State relationship are all examples of how life can be studied in its institutionalized conduct. If man is by nature free and loves freedom, then why at all bow to any social authority is the prime question which has to be addressed first.
Whenever a social, racial, economic or political order evolves, it always evolves around an unwritten understanding of give and take between the society and the individuals which collectively make the society. No individual will ever readily surrender his freedom but only on the understanding that in the bargain he gains more than what he has lost.
Primarily, it is individual security which he bargains for at the cost of some personal freedom. On the one hand he surrenders some of his rights to whatever institution he becomes a member of and, on the other, he gains some guaranteed protection and such assistance as would make his individual existence easier and more comfortable.
It is interesting to note that in the beginning of the formation of society at all levels, individuals always emerged as beneficiaries. This is what we find as a natural trend in the animal kingdom. This is also true of human societies at their rudimentary level. But human societies as they grow more organized, tend to become lopsided in the distribution of power between them and the individual. The larger the ratio between the membership of the society and the ruling few grows, the greater becomes the danger of misappropriation and exploitation of power by the ruling minority.
Although theoretically it is possible for the individual to gain some value in exchange for every loss of his liberty, it does not always happen in accordance with what should normally be expected. The prime principle of individual liberty is gradually and progressively sacrificed at the altar of society. It often happens that the society as it grows, becomes more authoritative and less mindful of the ultimate interest of the individual.
On this subject we shall have a more comprehensive discussion later, when we take up the issue of Marxism. Here the purpose is merely to determine the basic cause of this degenerative process. Why should not an individual feel more comfortable and better protected in a more developed and powerful society? Among animals we never come across a decadent and degenerative trend in their social conduct. Why should human society alone fall short of its expectations in relation to its responsibilities towards the rights of the individual?
One dividing line between animals and humans which distinctly separates them is the powerful tendency in man to defraud, cheat and break the laws of nature. In this game the humans outpace all other animals by a phenomenal margin. Animals too, sometimes appear to cheat but it is always a strategy on their part, and not a deception in the criminal sense. There is no breach of trust in their case such as we observe among the humans. They live a normal and simple disciplined life within the gamut of natural laws which control and command them. If they do ever seem to cheat they do so only intuitively, as governed by their genetic pulses which lie outside the definition of crime.
This in fact is a by-product of the gift of freedom of choice. Animals are strictly governed by intuitive and instinctive laws and have little choice in the matters of right and wrong. In fact no right or wrong exists for them.
It is humans alone who can wilfully ignore their responsibilities and usurp the rights of other members of society knowing it to be wrong. So the individual freedom in relation to the collective responsibility man owes to any institution is undermined and sabotaged by his propensity to break laws, commit frauds and act wrongfully, yet hoping to run away with whatever he can. Hence when Karl Marx observed that man is a corrupt animal, he was very right indeed—only he had no right to exclude himself. Nor had he any right to exclude the socialist leadership which was to be built upon the bricks of immorality. This has been the tragedy of human society throughout the ages. No institution is exempt from this. This inevitable built-in flaw in the individual social relationship promotes the tendency among systems towards ever increasing legislation.
Apparently, every new law is aimed at protecting the right of the individual on the one hand, and the right of the society on the other, from unjustified trespass into each other’s exclusive domains of rights and prerogatives. But unfortunately because of the corruption in man, the legislators fail to remain loyal to the principles of absolute justice. During the collective process of legislating, many a time the individual will be deprived of his fundamental rights at the hands of the very institutions which were created to defend them.
We do not propose here to take up the issues of religious societies at length, but from the secular viewpoint of social philosophy, religion should also be briefly mentioned. The sociologists as a class do not treat religion as a Divine phenomenon. Hence, from their vantage point religion is just another expression of the social behaviour of man.
If their view of the development of the institution of religion is right, then all religious societies should be viewed as occupying a unique position among the human social systems. They would be perceived as symbols personified of fraud committed both against the society and the individual. Evidently, in that case, all founders of religions should be classified as prime crooks who wilfully deceive the common masses in the name of gods of their own creation as implied in the sociologist’s theory. Some crooks indeed!
They, according to the sociologist’s view, legislate themselves on behalf of God to keep the simple unsuspecting common people chained to the so-called Divine laws. Thus, in the name of God it is a fraudulent religious hierarchy which rules to its own advantage. This is the sociologist’s perception of a religious society. Karl Marx also seems to be in full agreement with this view of religion as an opiate concocted to keep the labouring multitudes forever doped, lest they should wake up to the awareness of their merciless exploitation by the bourgeoisie. The name of this potent opiate which keeps the proletariat drugged is the code of morality advocated by all religions. As such, morality is always linked to the idea of God which commands and trims human behaviour in His name.
The Islamic point of view can be presented from two different perspectives: first by analysing the work of various Muslim thinkers, and second by attempting to directly assess the Quranic stance in the light of the Sunnah which comprises both verbal instructions as well as the practice of the Holy Prophet(sa). The authenticity of the former’s understanding of Islam becomes more and more dubious with the passage of time. It is so because they are inclined to turn progressively more dogmatic in their inferences which may not always be rational and justified. Otherwise what they call Islamic is of course initially based on their study of the fundamentals of Islam. Those who draw their inferences from the Quran and the Sunnah can only be treated as a separate category if they strictly adhere to the principle of rationality. Such an analytical study of the major issues will be made later in this book. Presently, we turn our attention to the former and discuss the thought processes of early Muslim scholars, sages and philosophers in the era that led to the formation of many different schools of Islamic thought. Two distinctive influences were at play during the early period of Islamic history:
The most powerful and predominant was the influence of the Quran and the Sunnah, which had revolutionized the concept of knowledge and broadened the horizon of study and investigation to unsurpassed dimensions.
A growing interest in Greek philosophy and sciences, as well as the study of classical philosophy of India, Persia and China, had also a role to play in the development of Muslim thought. This paved the way for various alien philosophers to become the focus of Muslim attention independently or in conjunction with Islamic teachings.
Because of this interest in various alien philosophies and a desire to interrelate them with Quranic revelations, new schools of thought developed. These schools are called Islamic for the simple reason that Islamic thought, education and beliefs had primarily cradled them. Hence, the philosophies foreign to Islam interplayed with their previously held views, founded solely on the basis of the Quranic studies. Despite the fact that they were branded as un-Islamic because of their flexible accommodating attitude by some of the narrow-minded scholars, there is no shadow of doubt that these great scholars remained essentially Muslim. Their association with secular branches of knowledge was seldom at the cost of their faith. In this regard, everyone has the right to decide for himself whether, after an appropriate study of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah, any philosophical point of view presented by such thinkers is to be accepted as Islamic or not. However, the conclusions they draw always remain open to question. Some may find them in accordance with the Islamic teachings and some may not. Yet it does not give anyone the right to suspect their intentions. It is the right of every seeker of truth to form his own conclusions after sincerely attempting to understand the Quran and the Sunnah in depth. So also is the right of others to disagree with him, but neither has the authority to deprive the other of his fundamental right to believe in whatever he may and believe himself to be true.
We will now briefly introduce a few of the varied schools of Islamic thought which arose because of different conclusions they drew from the study of the same sources. However, it should be remembered that every school that claims to be based on the Holy Quran and Sunnah ought to be carefully evaluated with direct reference to the evidence they quote in their support. Of the various ideologies and points of view thriving in the age of Muslim domination, not all could be described as Islamic in character. Some of them were partially contradictory or even diametrically opposed to each other. This however does not divest them of the right to be referred to as Islamic by their proponents.
The Ashariyyah school of thought is indebted to Imam Abul Hassan ‘Ali Bin Isma’il Al-Ashari (260-330 AH) for giving it its distinctive style among the other prevalent schools of thinking. This was an era when some Muslim scholars of the period were rapidly inclining towards rationalism, a need was thus felt to react against this trend. At the head of this reactionary movement was the famous Imam Isma’il Al-Ashari. It is ironic that Al-Ashari’s own teacher, Al-Jubbai (d. 303 AH), was one of the leading rationalist scholars of the time. Imam Ashari not only voiced his disagreement with the rationalist, but also powerfully revealed the inadequacies of any system placing total reliance upon rationality for the discernment of truth.
For the Ashariyyah, rationality led neither to the acquisition of certain knowledge nor to eternal truth, rather they considered that it led to greater doubt and contradictions. The Asha’irah stressed that real knowledge applied only to the recognition and acceptance of revelation as the only means to reach eternal truth because the ultimate source of truth is God Himself. Therefore the only way to attain it is through Divine revelation.
In their reaction against rationality, some Asha’irah went to such extremes as to reject any explanation of Quranic verses supported by human logic. They went so far as to totally deny any figurative interpretation of the Holy Quran. Imam Ashari himself was a skilled logician. The arguments he forwarded against the use of rationality were, interestingly, themselves based on rationality. One of his famous public debates against his own teacher, ‘Allamah Al-Jubbai, highlights this point.
‘What is your opinion about the salvation of three brothers: a believer, a non-believer and a child?’ Ashari questioned Al-Jubbai.
‘The believer will go to heaven, the non-believer will go to hell, but the child will neither go to heaven nor to hell, because none of his acts are worthy of reward or punishment,’ Jubbai replied.
Ashari commented, ‘The child could argue with God, “If You had given me some time, I would have done some good deeds. So why should I be deprived of heaven?”’
Jubbai retorted, ‘God could reply, “I knew that if you had grown older you would do bad deeds. Thus your death at this early age is really a favour, because you have been saved from hell.”’
Ashari replied, ‘At this stage the non-believer will interrupt and will blame God for not granting him death at the same age as the child so that he could be saved from bad deeds.’
It is worthy of note that Ashari while arguing against rationality was himself employing all the weaponry of the rationalists. Thus it is not correct to say that he was totally against rationality. The followers of this school of thought, such as Imam Ghazali and Imam Razi, relied heavily on rational arguments to resolve their problems and establish their beliefs. Possibly the excessive reaction against reliance on rationality was due to a fear that new philosophies, which were being introduced to the realm of Islam, might jeopardise the Islamic viewpoint. It was suspected that the use of reason might lead to movements that would ultimately deviate from the true Islam. Hence, all such movements with rationalistic leanings were dubbed as Ilhadi or innovative, which is a derogatory term because it implies deviation from the right path. The concern of the rigid orthodoxy was reflected in the terms they used to describe the founders of the rationalist movements. They referred to them as Mu‘tazilah or those who had strayed from the true path and become Ilhadi.
Another group known as Maturidiyya believed that revelation should be first accepted as such and then logical explanations required to support it should be sought. They believed that revelation strengthened faith while logical explanations provide further satisfaction to that faith. The Ashariyyah did not reject logical explanations entirely, but considered them superfluous; if they were available, then well and good, otherwise whatever was received through revelation was quite sufficient, even without the props of logic and rationality.
On the right wing of the Ashariyyah movement another sect came into being, known as Sulfia (the blind followers of well-established scholars of old). According to them, revelation should be accepted without question. No philosophical or logical explanation was permitted as they feared this would lead to deviation from the correct path.
The Mu‘tazilahs on their part did not reject revelation to be the most reliable instrument for leading one to the truth. They, however, emphasized that the real message of revelation could not be properly understood without the use of reasoning. Thus they gave reason preference over revelation only in the sense that whenever the two appeared to clash, rationalistic understanding must prevail, not as an alternative to revelation, but as a genuine clarification of the revealed message. They held the view that it becomes very difficult to get to the truth of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah without rationally deciphering the various similes, metaphors and symbols that are extensively used therein. For example they pointed out that expressions such as God’s hand and face must be interpreted to mean His power and grace and so on. Al-Ashari in turn stressed that such references in the Quran represented real attributes of God whose precise nature was not known, albeit he agreed that no physical features were meant by such terms.
Although the Mu‘tazilah movement appears to resemble in character the European schools of thought from the ninth to the seventeenth centuries, it did not take the Ilhadi (innovative) turn which European rationalism had taken during its progressive decline. The Mu’tazilah always drew upon the original Islamic sources of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah to support their arguments, always remaining comfortably close to them—never permitting themselves to drift far apart.
Today there is very little apparent difference between Mu‘tazilah and Ashariyyah viewpoints. Although the historical perspective portrayed above has left its mark on the scholarly pursuits of the contemporary generation of Muslim scholars, the sharp divisions of the past are no longer clearly defined. The scholars of today seem to advocate their personal views more than the views of any previous sectarian schools of thought. However, the remnants of past conclusions are still discernible. They are the product of a gradual compromise that developed between the different schools over the ages. Among them are those who are decidedly medieval in their attitudes but they do not quote exclusively from any previous school to support their viewpoint. They jump from one to the other in search of any scholar belonging to any school of thought who can be quoted in their favour. For them the boundaries between different medieval sects disappear but medievalism itself continues to exist, guiding their path. The same is true to a degree of the so-called modernists. Whenever it suits their purpose they will not hesitate to quote any of the earlier scholars in their favour but they feel free to innovate in other areas of their personal views.
Sufism was quite popular in Turkey, Iran and in the countries to the east of Amu Darya, an area historically referred to as the Trans-Oxus. Many Muslims from the former USSR were followers of Sufism, which has played a very important role in keeping Islam alive in their countries during the Tsarist as well as the Communist era.
The point most forcibly stressed by Sufism was that beneath the form of religion, there operates an underlying spirit of revelation which must be given preference over the form. What the Sufis understood to be the underlying spirit was simply the ultimate goal which all religions strive for. The ultimate goal was identified as the love of God and communication with Him. Hence, to them, if you reach this goal somehow with or without adherence to the form, the purpose will be served and that is all that is required. All the Sufis however, did not abandon the form altogether and kept subjecting their lives in accordance with the laws of Islamic Shari‘ah as they understood them. Yet they would spend most of their efforts not engaged in formal worship but repeating certain attributes of God day in and day out to help focus their attention entirely to the memory of God. Such practices, at times, drifted close to the yogic practice discussed in the section on Hinduism. Sometimes new ways and modes of remembrance were innovated by different Sufi saints, which, finally, got almost entirely divorced from the well-established Sunnah of the Holy Founder(sa) of Islam. Yet the followers of such Sufi sects adhered to them more passionately and vehemently than to the Quranic teaching itself. Thus, new schools of Sufism cropped up at different times and in different countries of the Muslim world.
The purpose of this exercise is not to go into a detailed account of the development of Sufi thought—or the schisms which appeared among the Sufis later on—but one thing which most clearly distinguishes Sufism in Islam from all other similar practices is the unshakeable belief of the Sufis in the continuity of revelation or their communion with God. In fact, all the eminent Sufis in Islam have claimed to be in constant communication with God and many a revelation bestowed upon them has been recorded in authentic books. Yet there are some among the Sufis who have broken all ties with the fundamentals of Islam. To them the purpose of religion is only to lead man to God and the forms of worship have become redundant for those who have already achieved this purpose. They introduced certain mental and spiritual exercises with the claim that they were sufficient to establish a sort of communication between man and God which is sometimes described as an awareness of oneness with Him. It did not take long for music and drug addiction to find their way into this school of Sufism, to break them loose from reality to drift aimlessly into a world of delusion. However, all Sufi movements did not start their journey with innovations, though, very often they were led to them during their decadence later on.
There are four major well-established and highly revered sects of Sufism which also deviated from the path of Shari‘ah with the passage of time. Yet as for their founders, their loyalty to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah remained unquestionable and uncompromising. These major sects are Chishtiyyah, Soharverdiyyah, Qadiriyyah and Naqshbandiyyah—which are further divided into many other sub-sects. They all stress the importance of abstinence and austerity to facilitate the attainment of truth. Initially, these practices were not a substitute for the traditional Islamic observances, but were carried out in addition to them.
Gradually the Sufi understanding of the creation creator relationship began to be influenced by such philosophies as were alien to Islam. For instance, the influence of classical Greek philosophy can be traced in some Sufi sects. The Greek notion of pantheism was adopted in a modified form by some Sufi sects, though strongly opposed by others. The opponents of pantheistic tendencies stress that there is a clear and distinct separating line between God and His creation. According to them though the creation bears a stamp of the Creator and reflects Him, yet it is not diffused with His identity. By contrast, some other factions believe that because the whole universe is a manifestation of God, there can be no clear distinction between the Creator and the creation. For them, creation cannot be separated from God because His attributes are inseparable from the nature of all that He has created. No separating line can be drawn. Hence God is the universe and the universe is God. Yet He has His own independent Will, which works like the natural properties in matter.
At first sight this view of the universe may appear to be entirely pantheistic, in which God is everything and everything is God. But a significant difference should be noted. The pantheistic notion of God is not one that recognizes an externally existing Conscious Creator, a Being who communicates with man through revelation, who takes interest in their trials, tribulations and joys and offers them guidance. The Muslim Sufis, in contradiction to the classical pantheistic view continued to believe in the independent identity of God who, though reflected in His creation, was also the Creator.
As for the Sufis’ temperament, they were seldom inclined to fierce, strongly worded debates. They often practised moderation in their belief, while respecting and tolerating views opposing their own. The same cannot be said of the orthodoxy which grew progressively jealous. Hence most sufi sects had to encounter extreme hostility at the hands of the orthodox clergy. Very often there arose a countermovement from among the orthodoxy. Every Sufi sect had to encounter similar experiences of extreme hostility from time to time. The Sufis who adhered to the pantheistic concept of God were specifically targeted by the mainstream clergy for their wrath. At times they were even condemned to death and brutally murdered. Their protestations that their pantheistic philosophy in no way compromised the unity of an independent Supreme Creator were of no avail and they were roundly condemned for claiming to share godhead with God. Hence the orthodoxy often resorted to perpetrating crimes of persecution against them.
The case of the renowned Sufi, Mansoor Al-Hallaj, would serve a befitting example of how such Sufis were treated for their alleged proclamation of being God themselves. He was condemned to hang by the neck for shouting in ecstasy ‘Anal-Haq, Anal-Haq’ (I am the Truth, I am the Truth). The orthodoxy understood this to mean that he was claiming to be God himself, whereas he had proclaimed in his sublime spiritual ecstasy, simply a total annihilation of himself. What he meant was that he mattered naught; all that mattered was He (God). Mansoor Al-Hallaj climbed the gallows with his head held high, not the least daunted by his imminent death. Nor could his shouts be drowned in the tumult of abuses which were hurled at him; they rose loud and clear and high ‘Anal-Haq, Anal-Haq’ until his soul departed to the fountainhead of his life on high.
Another Sufi sect was born on the issue of whether the external universe was a fact or merely an impression of the mind. This in fact was an age-old question which was even addressed by Plato and Aristotle. It could not come to a conclusion then, nor could it be concluded by the Sufis. Still it is a live debate among philosophers. No contemporary philosopher can ignore it because neither time nor space can be visualized without the coming into play of the human mind. A mad man’s imagination seems as real to him as a scientist’s observation of the laws of nature in action. Examined from such angles, these problems appear to be insoluble.
Again, every person’s impression of the external universe is different from that of others. However, some perceived images of the elementary world around us and the understanding of their properties are often shared by most observers. For example, most people would agree about the definition of an article as simple as a chair or a table. Yet there are numerous other common things about which people may not necessarily agree with each other. For instance, the colour of things may appear different to people with different eyesight. Similarly, all faculties which we possess are not shared equally by everyone else. Sense of smell differs, so also the sense of heat or cold varies with every person. Moreover, a change in the point of observation will present a different visual percept to the same observer. Hence the perception of the same thing by the same observer will vary with the change in point of perception. Add to this, different moods and different states of health, the problem would be immensely multiplied. No objective truth would seem to completely agree with the subjective truth which people fathom within their brains. In short, subjective impressions cannot always be related to the outer world in exactly the same way. This, in the opinion of some philosophers, deprives the viewer of the possibility of ever achieving absolute certainty in relation to whatever he perceives.
The aspect of uncertainty and unreliability of impressions as mentioned above, gave birth to another Sufi sect which totally denied the outer existence of things and claimed that eternal truth was merely a subjective notion. Those who were more extreme among them totally denied the existence of any external physical form, including their own. Thus, an intellectual movement that started with an attempt at an extra fine discernment of detail and perception of outside reality ended up in utter madness. Yet there was a strange magic in this madness, that sometimes spellbound the wisest of the logicians and the academics of their time.
An interesting episode is related about a renowned Sufi leader of this sect, who was summoned to the court of a king to hold a debate with some of the outstanding scholars of his time. But to the amazement and chagrin of all, the outcome of the debate turned out to be exactly the opposite of what they had expected. Within a few exchanges of arguments and counter-arguments the great academics were driven out of their depth, gasping for their breath and groping for words. None could succeed in matching the intricacies of the Sufi’s ethereal logic. At this point, the king was struck with a brilliant idea and ordered the warden of the elephants’ house to have the most ferocious of his elephants brought to the palace grounds. This particular elephant happened to be stricken with a madness no less than that of the Sufi. The only difference perhaps was that in the Sufi’s mind the outer reality did not exist. But the elephant wanted to destroy all outward reality himself. From the one end the Sufi was pushed into the open and from the other the elephant was let loose. The Sufi without losing his breath, ran for his life forthwith.
Observing this, the king shouted from the balcony of his palace, ‘Don’t run away O Sufi, from this phantom elephant. He is only a figment of your imagination!’
‘Who is running away?’ shouted back the Sufi. ‘It is only a figment of your imagination.’
Thus ended the predicament of the Sufi but not the debate itself. It still rages on.
We have already discussed the controversy regarding the superiority of revealed truth, vis-à-vis observational truth. Some thinkers give preference to revelation over logic, and some others do the vice versa. Ibne Rushd (known in the West as Averroes), one of the greatest Muslim thinkers of all-time, proposed the idea that the above views express parallel realities and should be treated separately. Revealed truth should be accepted as such and the knowledge gained from observation and experiment should be accepted for what it is. For him, it was not necessary to seek a correlation between the two, nor was there any need to search for contradictions and attempts to resolve them.
This was the age when Muslim scientists were making rapid progress in Spain in their pursuit of scientific knowledge. They did so undeterred by the fact that some religious scholars of the older schools were issuing edicts of Ilhad (innovation) against them. Ibne Rushd may have thought it better not to get involved in such controversies, lest it should impede the progress of science.
What he evidently avoided was the danger of finding contradictions between religion and science. A true believer in Islam and a scientist dedicated to the truth without prejudice as he was, this policy served the cause of both religion and science in Spain admirably for a long time to come. The danger of contradiction between the revealed truth and the observed truth was never squarely confronted. Hence the issue of preferences never arose seriously. This ‘no-conflict policy’ remained predominant in Spain for many centuries, thanks largely to the prudence of Ibne Rushd.
When we re-examine the possible issues of controversy in the afterglow of what followed, we can say with certainty that the age was not yet ripe for such issues to be addressed. The possibility of defective or partial perception or even a complete misunderstanding of the observed facts could not be ruled out.
For example, in medieval times the ideas adopted by Muslim scientists about the universe were not really based on the Holy Quran or Hadith, but were, for the greater part, influenced by the prevailing ignorance of that age. The religious scholars as always happens, considered their own views to be Islamic and as such final, while there was little they could understand of the true Quranic views in the context of the prevailing knowledge.
On such a matter in Spain, there does not appear to have been any dialogue between scientists and religious scholars. There was no forum for the transfer of knowledge between these two groups, nor any debates about the comparative merits of their respective beliefs. Consequently, there were no Galileos in Spain who had to choose between life and truth. The scientists and their contemporaries did not even attempt to explain to the religious scholars their compulsion to call a spade a spade when they saw one, nor did they find it necessary to prove to them that their interpretation of the Holy Quran was wrong because it contradicted the known scientific facts of the time.
As a result, there developed two parallel movements which gradually grew further apart with the passage of time. It so happened at last that Islamic knowledge took a completely different course from that of the philosophical and scientific channels of thought, never to cross their path. They were like two streams running in parallel without interrupting each other’s flow.
Consequently, the Islamic nation of Andalusia (the title of the Muslim Empire in Spain), outpaced other Islamic countries in most fields of scientific research. Further to its advantage, Spain enjoyed a long and seldom broken period of relative peace, safe from the attacks of invaders such as Ghengis Khan and Halaku Khan. This period of Islamic history in Andalusia could be rightly considered as the golden age of Rationalism. With the expulsion of Muslims from Andalusia, the great era of Muslim domination came to an end. All ties of Islam with the Spanish people were severed. If ever a tragic retrogression of intellectual and scientific advancement took place anywhere in the world, it took place in the land of Andalusia. And what a tragic retrogression it was. As the gates were opened at the southern end of Andalusia for the exodus of Islam, out went along with it wisdom, knowledge, fair play, truth and light in all its spectra, perhaps for centuries not to return. But the light flooded out not in the direction of the journey of the Muslim expatriates. Spain was once again plunged into the utter darkness of the pre-Islamic era. The world of Islam elsewhere did not fare better either. There, the darkness was to grow from within. It was the darkness of religious prejudices, bigotry, narrow-mindedness, arrogance, egoism and mutual jealousies, which began to rage like hellfire. It began to rise like a column of smoke spreading far and wide screening the light of heaven out. Thus the land beneath was covered by progressive shadows of darkness which grew and thickened over the years.
As for the inhabitants of northern Europe, it was a different story altogether. That which was lost to the people of Spain turned out to be their gain. And what a gain it was. The same Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand who had thrown the Muslims out of the country did not take long to turn their wrath upon the Jews under the ever growing influence of a bigoted, despotic Christian priesthood. As the southern gates of Andalusia were opened to flood out the Muslims, the northern gates were opened wide for a large scale exodus of the Jews. Among them were highly knowledgeable people, great scholars, scientists and intellectuals who excelled in many professions. They had mastered many skills during the seven centuries of the beneficent Muslim rule. They had gained excellence in all fields of human occupation such as industry, trade, scientific research, architecture, sculpture, surgery and many other similar areas. A persistent well-organized scheme of persecution banished the Jews out of the country, after dispossessing them of all their belongings. It were they who carried the torches of knowledge all the way from Muslim Andalusia to the South of France and beyond. The philosophies of Aristotle and Plato began to reach Europe through the Muslim philosophers of Spain. The healing genius of Avicenna, the greatest physician ever known to the world till his time, and the wisdom of Averroes who combined in himself secular and religious philosophies and sciences also began to dawn upon the European horizon. Thanks largely to the exodus of the Jews, their great works were transported across and translated into various European languages by scholars. In fact, it was they who laid the foundation of a new era of enlightenment in Europe, known as the Renaissance.
Turning our gaze to the post-Spanish era we observe the same gloomy view fraught with tragedy hanging over the entire world of Islam. From then on, Muslim countries other than Spain lost their interest in the secular sciences and their quest for investigation and research which they themselves had once promoted and advanced to such high levels of excellence.
This unfortunate trend proved counterproductive not only in the field of science, but also in the field of religion itself. The Muslim Ummah (the Muslims as a people) further split and broke into schisms and factions. The noble doctrine of the unity of God became the victim of this destructive suicidal trend. Cracks began to appear in the image of God itself which began to be interpreted so differently as though they were talking of different gods rather than One. Their search for knowledge was not quenched however, only their preferences were changed.
They continued to debate the issues of right and wrong with the same vehemence as before while the subject of discussion had changed. Yet they remained engrossed in the same questions which for centuries had agitated them. Instead of the serious issues of fundamental practices, their jurisprudence remained occupied by trivialities such as the eating of the flesh of crows. Riots are reported to have erupted on this issue between the supporters of the two opposing views. The polemics which resulted grew progressively more complicated and involved. It is a tribute to their intellect that they could really build mountains out of molehills—a tribute which at the same time was reflective of an utter lack of common sense. Senseless intellectualism is the name for what they did!
Some of the other so-called “highly important” questions which kept agitating their minds also stirred their blood to a pitch of high frenzy. Among them was a question as banal as that the case of a dog which may have fallen into a well. How many bucketfuls would have to be drained out before the remaining water became clean for the purpose of ablution, was the all-important question which engaged the attention of great scholars of that time. Let alone a dog, if a Mullah accused of heresy, by the clerics of another school, fell into a well of theirs, the question would acquire far more serious implications. How many buckets would have to be hauled would become a complex mathematical exercise. Many may have preferred that well to be filled with earth, having turned into the burial pit of the same Mullah. Such was the time and such were the tales built on the realities of their mad intolerance.
Bizarre as they may appear, seldom were they altogether false. The jurisprudence of that period must have gone berserk! They were involved in such meaningless debates as made as mockery of the holiest of the Muslim religious practices such as “Salat”—the formal prayer.
The Muslims always recite the fundamental article of faith during the sitting posture of the second Rak‘at of their prayers. During this declaration some raise their index fingers and some do not. But jurists of that period were sharply divided on this issue. They were bent upon punishing the finger which had offended their sensibility.
Raised or not raised, the offending wretch must be chopped off, was their unanimous verdict. They differed on everything else but not on this. To go to the wrong mosque was a grave risk indeed. The entry was no problem of course but it was the exit which posed real problems. They might have to walk out with one finger less than the five Allah had bestowed upon them!
A third small issue was related to the saying of “Ameen”, which is recited after the recitation of Surah Fatihah by the Imam. The ‘vital’ point under discussion was whether it should be said aloud or quietly. It was quite likely for the ‘loudists’ to be beaten if they had blurted Ameen loudly in a mosque where it was considered a serious crime. A silent Ameen among the loudists was no less provocative.
The most prominent among such doctrinal differences which acquired deadly dimensions was concerning the creation or the non-creation of the Holy Quran. The holders of these opposite views had no doubt whatsoever that disagreement on such vital issues was punishable by death. But it all hung on the great dispenser of justice—chance. If the king was on the side of etemalists, the holders of the contrary doctrine were not only murdered, but even burnt alive in their homes. When chance took the swing to the other side, the persecutors became the persecuted. Many a time, the long dead and buried were not spared the punishment either. They were dug out from their graves and publicly hung, for the living to learn their lesson. But what lesson could one draw anyway? Which side of the see-saw was safer remained the unanswered question. For those involved in these trivial broils with such seriousness, their life upon earth was turned into hell. And the threat of hell after death, hurled at them by their opponents, did not have to wait to be reached till after death!
The centuries of darkness of the medieval ages began to cast their deadly shadows far and wide, and the world of Islam which had emerged from darkness to light as the sun of Islam rose from the deserts of Arabia, was plunged once again into the abyss of ignorance. The vision of Islam began to flicker and change colours like distant stars seen through dark, gloomy nights with the change in the vantage point and the shifting of the angle of vision. The image of Islam lost its lustre and constancy.
The two major channels of enlightenment which could turn the darkness of ignorance into knowledge seemed to be shut forever. Neither was there clarity or integrity of vision left, nor was there any hope entertained for revelation from on high. To them both windows were closed. What a tragic end indeed.
However, some centuries later, the sun of secular knowledge began to rise once again but this time from the West. The transmitters of light from the East looked westward hoping to catch a glimpse of that which they had themselves bestowed upon the West some interminably long centuries ago it seemed.
When the sun of secular enlightenment finally set upon Andalusia, its radiant face rose from the horizon of France to smile upon what lay of Europe beyond. It lit up the entire Continent from South to North, and from East to West. A glorious day of knowledge broke which was to dominate Europe for centuries to come. The age of the Renaissance had begun.
But few in Europe realize today how much they owe to Muslim Spain for that great dawn of enlightenment called the Renaissance. Many outstanding philosophers, mathematicians, scientists, astronomers and physicians from Andalusia are but obliterated memories for Europe, buried in the forlorn graveyards of oblivion.
With the dawn of the Renaissance as the darkness was dispelled, reason and rationality began to dispossess the blind faith of the territories which it had long held under its mighty sway. To keep a balance between the secular philosophies on the one hand, and faith and belief on the other was not an easy task. It was no trivial challenge for the priest-ridden society of that age to defend their faith against the new philosophical invasion by reason and rationality. They had inherited an image of Christianity which largely under Pauline influence had disintegrated into mythical dogmas. It was no longer the same Divine light which had illuminated Christ.
Even before the Renaissance, some European intellectuals had attempted to maintain a balance between reason and faith. E.J. Scotus in the ninth century AD had set the noble example of bringing about a measure of truce between faith and reason. He maintained that truth cannot be reached through reason alone, but reason and faith had a part to play together. He suggested that in the beginning religious beliefs were founded on rational grounds. Convictions cannot be born out of mere conjectures. There has to be some logical basis for the building of convictions. Whether it is done advertently or inadvertently, for every conviction, as it is born, there has to be some rational basis. In short, Scotus believed that true faith should not be equated with myth. It should be understood to have been founded on some solid, rational platform. In the beginning when faith took root in the human mind, it could not have happened without some reason and logic to support it, he assumed. Yet with the passage of time, that link must have faded out and was no longer observable. From then on faith appeared to be suspended in mid-air without the pillars of reason to support it. Yet its firmness and tenacity which have stood the test of time are indicative that it could not have reached this high level of conviction altogether without reason or logic.
In conclusion, Scotus advises that the validity of one’s faith should be examined from time to time according to the dictates of rationality. If the two appear to be conflicting then one must follow reason. Thus reason will always hold an edge over faith.
NEWTON
This attitude is best illustrated in Newton’s (1642-1727) treatment of the Trinity. As long as he did not consciously and scientifically examine his inherited religious views, he continued to remain a devotee of the doctrine. But when at a later stage he decided to put his faith to the test of reason and rationality, he was left with no option but to reject the dogma of Trinity which in his view had failed the test of reason.
Thus he became the all-time greatest victim of the prejudices of the Christian church sacrificed at the altar of the cross. As a tribute to the genius of Newton, he was elected as a Fellow of the “College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity”, University of Cambridge, a post which he held for many years. In 1675 however, he was given the choice to either vacate his seat and keep his convictions, or to compromise his convictions and assert his orthodoxy under oath one last time in ordination.
But the “Holy and Undivided Trinity” itself stood in his way. His stubborn refusal to subscribe to the doctrine of Trinity cost him not only his fellowship, but also the handsome stipend of £60 a year. No small amount indeed, judging by the value of money in those days. He was dispossessed of his fellowship and chair from the university on the charge of heresy. The charge of heresy was levelled against him only because in Newton’s eyes worshipping Christ was idolatry, to him a fundamental sin. R.S. Westfall writes on Newton:
‘He recognized Christ as a divine mediator between God and humankind, who was subordinate to the Father Who created him.’1
‘The conviction began to possess him that a massive fraud, which began in the fourth and fifth centuries, had perverted the legacy of the early church. Central to the fraud were the Scriptures, which Newton began to believe had been corrupted to support trinitarianism. It is impossible to say exactly when the conviction fastened upon him. The original notes themselves testify to earlier doubts. Far from silencing the doubts, he let them possess him.’2
Hence, his faith in the Unity of God and rejection of the Trinity was based on his unbiased, honest investigation into the validity of Christian beliefs. There is many a note written in his own hand on the margins of his personal Bible:
‘Therefore the Father is God of the Son (when the Son is considered) as God.’3
Thus concludes Westfall:
‘ … almost the first fruit of Newton’s theological study was doubt about the status of Christ and the doctrine of the Trinity.’4
When during the Renaissance interest was renewed in this age-old question of faith versus rationality on a wider basis, it fell to the lot of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) to keep the flag of belief held high. The issue with him was not Christianity versus reason, it was a more straightforward issue of belief in the existence of God in an age of philosophical wanderings of the mind.
An exceptionally clear-headed logician as he was, he not only believed in God but was the first amongst the philosophers to boldly take up the issue of reason, leading to God. Fortunately for him, he refused to be drawn into a debate on the rationale of Trinity. What he proved was simply the existence of one Supreme Being. Perhaps it was this rejection on his part of the then prevalent Christian dogma, which lost him an honourable place among the believing intellectuals of that age. J. Gutman explains this situation in his book Philosophy.5 Here Descartes is not mentioned as a revelational theist, which he was, but he is merely spoken of as one who is purported to be a revelational theist. This treatment was meted out to him entirely because of his rationalistic disregard for Christianity’s distinctiveness.
Unfortunately, a rebellion against God, as such, did not hurt the sensibility of the Christian priests as much as the public denouncement of Christianity. It is a great tragedy that a philosopher and a mathematician of such an exceptionally high status as Descartes was not paid the homage due to him. It should be remembered that he was not merely a theoretical philosopher, he was also an outstanding geometrist who took the work of Pythagoras (c. 580-500 BC) on geometry to such heights as it had never scaled before. His solid contribution to geometry which comprised many pioneering works will always be remembered with heads bowed to his greatness.
Another mark of his greatness lies in the fact that he was the first to introduce the trend of mathematical argumentation into philosophy. His concept of truth and absoluteness begins with his journey of self-consciousness. His test of truth is related to the first impression one receives after hearing or observing something. He asserted that anything which fails to pass the criterion of truth immediately is worthy of doubt. In other words, anything one could believe to be true without any dialectical argumentation was acceptable as evident truth. Applying this logic to self-consciousness, the following is a paraphrase of his argument: because I think I am—and I accept this simple statement without supporting it with any logical deduction—so most certainly I am.
As such this becomes the first and the prime evident truth. A simple and charming phrase he coined in this regard was Cogito, ergo sum meaning ‘I think, therefore I am.’6 The second truth which he recognized after the first truth was the truth of the existence of God. He mathematically calculated that the very idea of such an existence was enough evidence of His existence just as the sum of the three angles of a triangle are most certainly equal to the sum of two right angles.
Whether his philosophical proof of the existence of God was acceptable or not to the generations of philosophers who followed him, at least they were all profoundly influenced by him. Thus, in the subsequent generations of thinkers, logic was freely employed for or against the belief in the existence of God. Dialectical materialism was also born as a subsequent development of the same trend.
This line of thinking continued into the seventeenth century when John Locke, Berkeley and Hume demarcated the boundary of phenomenon and reason as having no common borders with faith and belief. While subscribing to this philosophy, Locke did not specifically rule out the validity of faith and belief but left them alone for the believers to have faith in whatever way they chose. It was left to a later generation of European philosophers to deny the existence of God on the basis of logic—Rousseau and Nietzsche being most prominent among them.
Nietzsche declared God to be dead in his own dramatic style. Rousseau, on his part, advocated the synthesis of a new religion in place of revealed religions. He stressed the need for a religion based on a study of human nature and human experiences. He proposed that the human mind itself should create a civic code or rule of life. Rousseau seems to be among the first of the European philosophers who openly rebelled against the philosophy to have anything to do with the belief in God. It was an age when religion was profoundly and advertently affected by the rationalist movement.
This generation of philosophers was followed by Utilitarians like Mill and Sidgwick. Essentially they believed in the choice of advantage. Whatever was to one’s advantage, one should have free unrestrained access to it. But when it came to a clash between egoism and altruism they advised recourse to reason for arbitration between them.
This means that during the pursuit of pleasure when it comes to making a choice between extreme selfishness and selfless sacrifice of one’s own interest, reason should arbitrate between the two. A verbose philosophy indeed, meaning nothing in substance. Those given to pleasure would hardly need advice from Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick etc. to stop short at the border of moderation and desist from leaping into the domain of utter selfishness. For them the choice between egoism and altruism would be out of the question. Who would stand in need of arbitration of reason in the area of his sensual desires? A person given to lustful and carnal pleasures needs no counsel. He pursues this course knowing full well the pros and cons of it.
The Utilitarians were followed by a generation of philosophers, who left a deep mark on the history of European philosophy. Locke, Berkeley and Hume known as Empiricists stand at the head of the movement. Many a generation of philosophers was to be influenced by them. Their philosophy can be summed up in the simple statement: one should believe only in the conclusion drawn from experimental observation which is demonstrable. They believed that only pure reason and signs gave birth to ideas which were worthy of acceptance—the ideas which could be retried through scientific experimentation with unfailing consistency. A better definition of science cannot be visualized.
Hume was followed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who was deeply stirred and influenced by Hume’s realistic philosophy. Hence the realism of Kant owes much to the empiricism of Hume. Agnostic as he was, he was wise enough to realize the indispensability of morality. He was perhaps the pioneer in the suggestion that morality should be deduced from reason alone. He divided reality into phenomenal reality and noumenal reality. He believed that scientific investigation cannot go beyond phenomenon. As such he ruled out that the existence of God could be proved through the instrument of phenomenal investigation. His system is usually referred to as a transcendental idealism.
This in turn gave birth to Hegel’s absolute idealism. Many a new phrase was coined during this prolific period of the growth of his philosophy, such as the logical positivism, existentialism and objectivism. Yet no new dramatic chapter was added to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, who reigned supreme as the undisputed masters till the end of time. Even the smart cliches of dialectical materialism and scientific socialism were but other names for what we find freely discussed in the works of Aristotle. It should not be forgotten however, that the European philosophers were no less indebted to their Muslim forerunners of Andalusia and Baghdad, than they were to their Greek masters. This was the period when Hegel’s absolute idealism ruled supreme. Yet most of the Europeans little realised the fact that it was no more than the continuity of the idealism of Plato. If we understand Hegel correctly, for him subjectivism was inseparably related to the outside realities. This means that he did not deny objective realities altogether, but laid emphasis on the supremacy of ideas.
In the Islamic school of thought, the objectivist Sufis were a different tale altogether. They carried their subjectivism to such dizzy heights as the European philosophers could not have dreamt of. These Sufis could as well be referred to as illusionists.
As far as the the issue of revelation leading to knowledge is concerned, no such discussion is found in the works of European philosophers of any generations. Among the believers in the existence of God, Descartes continued to hold fast to his belief that reason must be placed before faith. He believed in God because his reason supported his belief, hence there was no contradiction in him. Voltaire and Thomas Paine maintained that in the development of human civilization, reason had played a far more significant role than faith. In metaphysical philosophy, abstract forms of existence beyond the material world have been the subject of discussion, but the question of revelation has never been examined with any seriousness.
Despite the philosophical interest of that age, in judging the comparative merits of faith versus rationality, they somehow remained silent on the issue of revelation having played any part in leading man to truth and knowledge. At best, their interest remained revolving around the existence of God, only philosophically. No quest was ever made to find out any traces of evidence in the universe which could lead to the proof of His existence. The validity of revelation from on high was never examined seriously. By comparison, the modem attempts to trace messages from aliens are taken far more seriously. Such attempts are already institutionalized and funded by great world powers.
As we get closer to the modem period, from the time of Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick we find an ever increasing reliance on rationality, while faith is gradually waived to a position of lesser significance. The ultimate victim of this emphasis on rationality has been the belief in God. Thus, rationality gained dominance slowly and gradually, like the appearance of a long, northerly dawn interrupted only by an occasional flurry of aurora.
The rationalists gave preference to reason over all other means of attaining knowledge and truth. Yet among the rationalists too, we find both believers in Christianity as well as non-believers. It was the latter, however, who consistently gained the upper hand. During the age of rationalism, the Church had to defend Christianity somehow with whatever logical arguments it could muster. But this proved a strategic mistake on its part, to be lured into the battleground of reason and rationality.
The most prominent theists of this period were Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel. Of them, it was Kierkegaard who first rang the bell of alarm warning the Church not to commit suicide by entering the arena of logical debate between faith and reason. Referring to Kierkegaard’s efforts to salvage faith from the onslaught of reason, Coppleston writes in ‘Contemporary Philosophy’:
‘For Kierkegaard, however, this procedure was simply a dishonest betrayal of Christianity. The Hegelian dialectic is an enemy within the gates; and it is not the business of any Christian writer or preacher to dilute Christianity to suit the general educated public. The doctrine of the Incarnation was to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness, and so will it always be. For the doctrine not only transcends reason but is repugnant to reason: it is the Paradox par excellence, and it can be affirmed only by faith, with passionate inwardness and interest. The substitution of reason for faith means the death of Christianity.’7
What Kierkegaard did not further elaborate was that the converse was also true. It nearly implied that the Christian faith was completely empty of reason and rationality. It could be adhered to only if one withdraws into the shell of obstinate rejection of reason. The moment the tortoise dares to stick his neck out, his head would be plucked by rationality, waiting for just such an opportunity. Yet Kierkegaard believed that he could keep both his Christianity and reason simultaneously. Perhaps he knew how to have his cake and eat it too!
Berkeley and Hegel remained consistently adamant that reason must be given preference over sensory experience. God to them was mainly a description invented to fill a void for a logical gap. Thus the debate continued to rage among the believing European philosophers and the non-believing ones. It raged on, until its fire was extinguished by burning itself out. All that was left, were the ashes of faith in caskets of agnosticism and atheism.
As for the believing Jewish philosophers, their strategy was much less vulnerable. They believed in the historicity of their faith. The victorious past of Judaism over its Gentile antagonists was sufficient for them to keep their cinders alive. To debate the issue between faith on the one side and reason on the other, was just irrelevant.
Among the atheists, Nietzsche, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Camus and Marx were a category in themselves. None believed in generalizations. As such, it was not possible for them to universalize subjectivity. The subjective experience of each person has a uniqueness about it which cannot be exactly shared by others.
We believe that here it is important to devote a sub section to Marxism. However much we may differ with this philosophy, it cannot be denied that it has universally earned for itself a permanent place which will always be treated with respect by an enormously large number of people all over the world.
Marx (1818-1883), among the atheist philosophers of the ninteenth century, should be treated separately in his own right. To him the denial of God is not merely incidental, it is an integral component of his philosophy, with which religion is absolutely incompatible. With him, humans are like elements interacting with each other under the socio-economic laws which govern them. They must be set free from the religious interference which distracts their natural course. To Marx, revelation and inspiration lie beyond the vocabulary of philosophical thought.
MARX
Next to him is Nietzsche, with his own special domineering personality. His sabre-like pen impales God as his prime victim, until he pronounces Him dead; or, so he thought. In fact he knew no God, other than the God of the Christian dogma and it was Him that his sword of reason had murdered. Thus, Kierkegaard is proved so right in his warning to the priests to maintain a sullen silence about the divine mystery of Trinity; rather than invite trouble by venturing to defend it with instruments of reason.
Most of the atheist European philosophers of that age were, in fact, driven to the denial of God largely by the Christian Church, which had mystified God’s image to the extent of absurdity. Among other atheist philosophers, Sartre (1905-1980) is perhaps the most interesting and playful. He knows how to coin simple phrases with profound ideas. At the helplessness of man in his freedom to shift for himself in a Godless universe, he exclaims:
‘ … man is condemned to be free.’8
By this he means that the responsibility to make choices for himself, which lies on every human shoulder, is a challenge extremely difficult to meet. There is no one else to help him or guide his steps in the dreary wilderness of existence. Commenting on the episode of Abraham(as), he explains the presence of angels as a psychic phenomenon. To him, that Divine revelation which the angels brought to Abraham(as) was no more than the anguish of his soul. Wrong as we may consider Sartre’s explanation, we must pay homage to his fiery outburst of desperation and vengefulness. This applies far more befittingly to Sartre himself who may have suffered pangs of anguish and exasperation in the emptiness of his Godless philosophy. Revelation is the anguish of the soul, is indeed a profoundly revealing statement from the vantage point of an atheist—if atheists ever admit to possessing souls. Bernard Shaw is close to Sartre, but not quite, when he defines revelation as ‘inner voices’—at best, a smart remark of a dramatist lacking the depth and force of Sartre’s reflection! All said and done, Sartre fails to distinguish between inspiration and revelation, terms that simply do not exist in his philosophy; what does exist is the agony of soul—a tongue of fire that leaps out in occasional outbursts of desperation. No revelation descends from on high, whatever rises, rises from the depth of human frustration.
Hegel (1770-1831) is another agnostic whose interest in denial is not as strong and committed. His philosophy is not directly related to religious issues. Among his outstanding contributions is his attempt to create a bridge between subjectivity and objectivity.
It was he who first presented the dialectical conflict between the ideas of one generation and the ideas of the following generation. This is the well-known Hegelian theory of dialectical struggle between thesis and anti-thesis. He simply believed in contrariety of ideas. This means that ideas which are contrary to each other, but not contradictory, are constantly locked in a dialectical struggle for supremacy.
This results in his thesis that superior ideas are inevitably born out of the preceding dialectical processes. This in turn results in the birth of another anti-thesis born out of the preceding theses. Thus it goes on and on until a stabilized thesis is ultimately reached which demonstrates a positive and lasting understanding of the nature of objective reality.
He used this method to establish the role of logic for attaining knowledge. However, this dialectical method of reaching truth is only possible within systems that are factual and not abstract. The final outcome of this struggle of ideas is what he referred to as the absolute idea. This was Hegel’s concept of ultimate reality on universal truth. To him history is nothing but the movement of thought, the integration of theses and anti-theses into syntheses. In Lenin’s words Hegel believed that:
‘Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain. By checking and applying the correctness of these reflections in his practice and technique, man arrives at objective truth.’9
For him any ideological theory that was not related to the realm of physical experience was not worthy of serious consideration. Thus, any discussion of its significance was only of academic interest.
Implementing Hegel’s philosophy, it was Marx who experimented on giving man a new code of life based purely on man’s reasoning. A purely secular exercise to begin with, it soon began to demand respect from society. A sort of man-made politico-economic religion was born, founded on the denial of God. Marxist scholars were in basic agreement with the Hegelian point of view, and rejected the notion of eternal truth. They did not accept the objective truth to be absolute. It was always relative to a particular time and circumstance.
ENGELS
Among the socialist thinkers, Engels accepted the idea of absolute truth, and thus met with Bogdanov’s disapproval. By and large, to the Communist philosophers, truth is the name of knowledge obtained by objective study, subject to a given time and state of affairs. Within these specifics, truth is knowledge, and knowledge is truth. As such, knowledge could be defined as a constantly changing objective truth, corresponding to ever-changing environments.
It did not take long before this materialist philosophy turned into an ordained way of life. Marx became the chief apostle of this Godless religion as well as its oracle. To him we must turn now for an in-depth study because it was the stupendous power of his idea and not the mere mechanism of dialectical materialism which was to change the face of the earth.
In the spectrum of conflict of human ideas and beliefs, religion stands at one extreme, with its emphasis on the role of revelation as the most valid guiding principle. Marxism stands at the other end with its total denial of revealed truth. Between these two occur various philosophies—some closer to one, some to the other. But negation of all that religion stands for is never found so total and absolute anywhere except in the Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism and scientific socialism.
Marx, among all the European philosophers, seems to be the most clear-headed, matter-of-fact, yet idealistic without confessing his idealism—extremely cunning in his philosophical strategy against God and religion. To him neither God nor revelation mean anything, so also, inspiration has no place in his philosophy. He would not agree with Hegel’s idealism which precedes objective realities and participates in their activation.
In Hegel’s philosophy, the idea is born first and material changes are brought about later under its influence. Thus, when they grow to a certain stage of maturity and become pregnant with new ideas, they in their turn are subjected to new trials of verification. Thus they move on, wave after wave, transferring the subjective realities into observable, demonstrable objective truths.
Marx is clever enough to suspect the tiger in the bush. If the subjective ideas turn into objective realities as Hegelian philosophy would require, then the subjective ideas must precede the objective reality. This would create a dangerous cause and effect chain. Ideas must require a preceding consciousness which cannot be conceived without life. As such, this would ultimately lead to God, as the Prime Mover, who can bring about objective changes with the instrument of idea. Perhaps it is for this reason that Marx does not openly subscribe to the Hegelian idealism. Yet, with a subtle twist in the sequence of cause and effect, he transforms Hegelian philosophy into that of his own. He puts matter before the idea. This dialectical struggle does not begin with ideas, but with matter which is governed by autonomous natural laws. As such, dialectical materialism must reach its logical conclusion, with or without the help of ideas. Sheer matter will carve its own course by working upon life and shaping its destiny. This philosophy preconceives the non-existence of God, Who has to be dislodged from the driving seat of human affairs. It is only man who is entitled to take command of his own affairs with full responsibility.
Thus Marx’s dependence on reason and logic is as total as his rejection of God and Divine revelation. Absolute idealism versus dialectical materialism are but questions of arrangement. Which precedes which, is the only issue to be determined.
This leads us to another important question which, when properly resolved, will help us better understand Marx’s hidden intentions. How could he ever envision the smooth and flawless working of any system without morality? He was far too intelligent to miss the point, but he was also intelligent enough to be able to perceive the link between morality and God. Man by nature is not a moral animal. On the contrary he is the most corrupt animal under the firmament of heaven. All attempts to make man moral emanate from a belief in God, but Marx knew full well that belief in God was incompatible with his philosophy. Everything that leads or may lead to God was taboo. He had to choose between the two options: either to promote morality within Communism to safeguard its interest and run the risk of leading the Communist world back to God, or to shun the risk and accept instead the possible threat to the system itself. Perhaps he hoped that the impending terror of punishment would adequately offset the absence of moral training among the custodians of Communist rule.
In this, however, he has been proved utterly wrong. Man is a corrupt animal, corrupt indeed even beyond the reach of the merciless retribution of a totalitarian regime to straighten him.
The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism leaves no room for God. It was for the same reason that Lenin launched a fierce campaign against those who dared to plead the cause of morality albeit within the framework of Communism.
LENIN
So in Marxism there is neither room for revelation from on high, nor for any code of ethics based on revelation. Marx must have deemed it essential to banish morality from human affairs because of its implied potential to lead to God.
Another potent reason why he may have rejected morality could be the fear that morality would stand in the way of uninhibited proletarian revolution. The proletariat were tied to their bourgeois masters, in the name of moral obligation. Such ties must be shattered and the masses must be set free to do whatever they could to rebel against their despotic usurpers. No moral obligation must be permitted to stand in the way. They should feel free to kill, murder, rob, burn and destroy to annihilate the bourgeois order of economic and political domination. Thus he perceived morality as an arch-enemy of his Godless system.
Despite this matter-of-fact level-headedness of Marx, he is still full of inconsistencies. He lays the foundation for his projected ideas so soundly and firmly on reason and analysis, that it is hard indeed to suspect him of the crime of inherent contradictions. Yet contradictions run deep in Marxism. The total rejection of morality on the one hand, and the launching of a revolutionary movement founded entirely on the moral phenomenon of sympathy, on the other, is one such example of inconsistency.
But that is not all. The sympathy for the cause of the miserable, if carried beyond all boundaries of justice and fair play leading to cruelty to others, is where the contradiction becomes more glaring. If there is no justice in human affairs and you start a movement in the name of justice to rehabilitate it, you cannot violate the very principle upon which your movement is resting. It would be like severing the very bough upon which one is perched.
Again, an advocate of a system which holds no brief for sentiments and moral considerations, seems at odds with himself when he expects total commitment of loyalty to a system which is essentially amoral. There is another contradiction in Marx which lies in his well-calculated and well-planned scheme to help the proletariat topple the despotic domination of the bourgeoisie. Call it scientific socialism or dialectical materialism, if this philosophy is correct then it should not require any outside assistance of humans manipulating and guiding its steps.
Another important point to be observed is that Marx’s dialectical materialism was clearly influenced by Darwin’s monumental work The Origin of Species. In fact, a deeper study reveals that dialectical materialism is merely another name for Darwin’s struggle for existence, extended into human affairs.
The supply of food and means of sustenance continue to dominate the life of Homo sapiens as they had ever dominated the earlier animal species before man. The same principle of the survival of the fittest continues to operate as it ever operated before. There is no choice or option for life to take a different course, other than the one dictated by this law. This is scientific. If Marxist philosophy does not possess this equality of finality and precision, then his doctrine cannot be entitled as scientific. Dialectical materialism would lose its significance as an inevitable natural phenomenon.
Examine now how different the case of Darwinian evolution is from that of dialectical materialism. The Darwinian principle of evolution predominates everything else in shaping life and carving its path. It needs no ideological campaign in its favour or external assistance to advance its cause. On the contrary, it has the potential to frustrate and destroy any outside attempt to obstruct its passage. If Darwin had not been born, if none had unravelled the mystery of evolution, the reality of evolution would have remained unchanged. The absence of Darwin could not make the smallest dent upon its inevitability.
The laws of nature do not depend upon the human understanding of their implementation. The perception of man has no part to play in the reality of their existence. Whether anyone understands them or not, the gigantic wheel of nature would continue to roll on.
How different is the case of dialectical materialism! Had Marx and Lenin not been born, a Communist revolution in Russia or anywhere else in the world could not have taken place. At that point in Russian history, She was ripe for revolution with or without Lenin. The only difference that Lenin made was to ride the crest of the imminent storm when it broke, loose, and exploited it to the advantage of scientific socialism. In the case of the Darwinian precept of evolution however, no advocate is ever needed to further its cause, no designer is required to assist the process of natural history.
When we compare Hegel’s philosophy with that of Marx, the central question which emerges is this: Do ideas precede objective changes in the material world, or is it the objective changes themselves which give birth to ideas as they roll on? If Marx is right, then he need not have launched an intellectual and idealistic campaign to bring about a Communist revolution. Anything contrary to the inevitable scientific conclusion could not have taken place.
If Communism were indeed a law unto itself like the law of evolution, then even the most powerful ideas together would not have impeded the advance of Communism even if they had colluded to do so. Here is the case of another contradiction in Marx. Apparently he pleads in the precedence of dialectical materialism over the idea, but in practice he leans entirely upon the power of idea to make it work.
If his vision were based on sound scientific principles, then it would bring about the inevitable transfer of economic and political power from the hands of a few to the hands of the numerous, as its logical conclusion. But the circumstances which created Marx and which created Lenin have no inevitability about them. For Marx to have been born with just the right faculties of head and heart and to win the support of a highly intellectual, influential and wealthy friend like Engels was not a natural outcome of dialectical materialism.
Again, his failure to bring about such a revolution in Germany, which according to his philosophy was an ideal arena with all the factors present to bring about a proletariat revolution, is proof enough that dialectical materialism by itself was not sufficient to change the political and economic face of the world.
The success of Lenin on the other hand, in a comparatively much less industrialised country than Germany, is yet another proof to support the proposition that the Russian revolution was merely coincidental and not a direct consequence of Marxism. It was a misfortune of Russian history that Lenin was available during that critical period when reaction to the Tsar’s despotic, selfish and evil rule, coupled with the frustration of defeat in the First World War, created the opportune moment for Lenin to pounce upon.
Russia was ripe for revolution anyway. Indeed, Russia was ripe for any revolution. Had it not been the Communist revolution, it could have been any other. All that was needed was a leader of Lenin’s status. It was a mere accident that in Lenin, Russia found the revolutionary leader who happened to be a scientific socialist pupil of Marx. He, who condemns exploitation in severest terms emerges himself as the worst exploiter of Russian History. It was Lenin who dictated history in Russia and not dialectical materialism.
Apart from contradictions, Marx can also be blamed for at least one gross omission—his science of socialism completely ignores the factor of the mind from its computations.
Mind is the seat of ideas which has its own distinct identity apart from that of the brain. The brain is the material abode of mind, but the mind which occupies and dwells in the abode is not material. If the brain can be likened unto a computer, then the mind could be conceived as its operator. A clever idea is born when the mind manipulates the computeral brain. Even if any two material brains were to be one hundred per cent alike, if different minds operated them, the ideas thus born out of them will not be identical.
All the human scientific, social, economic and political progress is taking shape under the sway of the mind. The powerful nations of the world exercise their authority over the weaker nations merely because of their accumulated superior power of the mind. It is the same resources of the mind at the disposal of the bourgeoisie which make them most formidable in their absolute command of power. The doctrine of dialectical materialism however, does not take this most powerful factor into account.
It was a mistake on the part of Marx to believe that the accumulated wealth in a capitalist system is the sum total of conserved labour which the capitalists exploited. This conserved energy, he believed, comes from the unpaid dues of the exploited labour and the interest accrued from the idle capital deposited in the banks. Thus the proletariat majority is robbed by the bourgeois few. But sheer labour in itself cannot accumulate wealth without being wedded to the superior power of the mind. This in fact is conveniently ignored by Marx. The progressive scientific inventions which have revolutionised the input-output ratio of labour versus production are essentially the product of mind.
The labour in many a third world country continues to toil and sweat, yet their output is nothing compared to that of the labour in the highly developed industrial countries. Superior tools and highly mechanised productive units and modem technology, when wedded to labour, make all the difference. It is this superior potential achieved with the faculty of the mind which enhances productivity. Otherwise, labour is labour, whether in England or in Bangladesh, in the Pacific Islands or the African jungles; why then is some labour rewarded far more than the labour employed elsewhere? Evidently, it is the mind which plays a decisive role in this unequal reward. It should be remembered here that the power of the mind is a natural factor which can be played for good or evil depending on who employs it.
As labour aided by the mind becomes far more productive, so also is the case of capitalism which when rightly aided by superior mind becomes formidable. This power of capitalism does not flow automatically from the accumulation of wealth into fewer hands. The accumulation of wealth in fewer hands can only be made possible if the power of the mind is working on its side. If the power of the mind is evil Mafias will begin to be created. Against such Mafias the entire might of the proletariat will stand no chance of succeeding.
The number of such Mafias, once begun, forever multiplies extending their domain over every territory of human interests. In due time, they become ever more powerful, dictating terms to the high and low alike. In finance, in commerce, in politics, in business, in the pleasure industry, in health and in sickness, in the progressively expanding travel industry, in computers and electronics, everywhere, these Mafias will cast their evergrowing and deepening ominous shadows.
Hence it is the power of the mind, good or bad which ultimately governs the material world. The mechanism of dialectical materialism has no dominant role to play in shaping the destiny of man. Alas, the mind which has emerged to control world affairs is evil—an inevitable consequence of the rejection of God.
It is not a distinctive feature of Marxism alone that morality is denied any role in human affairs. That which Communists do openly, the capitalists do with a masterly hypocrisy. Their politics, trade and economics are no less devoid of morality, rendering them equal partners in crime with their counterparts across the border. The chance, that the proletariat in Communist states stand against their oppressors is as little as the one enjoyed by the multitudes in the capitalist world.
The Mafias created by power of evil minds in capitalism are no less horrendous then the ones operating among the Communist world when the helpless have-nots cross the path of their ruling class. It is this factor upon which we must concentrate now. Why should the erstwhile have-nots of a Communist hierarchy suddenly forget about all their miseries and suffering of the past, and begin to command the destiny of the masses with stony hearts and iron claws? What morals would govern them? What pangs of conscience would reproach them? When there is no morality, there are no pangs of conscience. It is this heartless mechanism of a merciless system in operation which is responsible for the ultimate failure of Communism.
A deep, careful examination of all absolute regimes would reveal a strange inherent paradox. It makes no difference whether they are built around a totalitarian philosophy of Communism or Fascism, or emerge as a dictatorial expression of power by a capitalist despot. They all have one thing in common: they cannot afford to be moral, because without merciless oppression they cannot survive, and morality cannot coexist with cruelty. Thus they thrive on the absence of morality, yet it is the very same absence of morality which brings about their ultimate downfall.
Mere ruthlessness is not sufficient to protect any totalitarian or despotic regimes. The power of cunning, scheming, plotting, conspiring minds is no less essential for their survival than ruthlessness is. It is the unholy wedlock between corrupt minds and merciless hearts which gives birth to all dictatorial regimes. It helps them to survive for a while but always deserts them in the end. The same factors of conspiracy and moral destitution become the ultimate cause of their downfall. In fact nothing good or bad happens in human affairs as a result of an inevitable inbred system. The two most important factors which shape human destiny are the factor of mind and the factor of morality. Their strength or weakness, their virtue or vice, decide the fate of every man-made plan. Hence, Marx is wrong on both counts. Remove the factors of mind and morality from scientific socialism and what is left is neither scientific nor social. The proletariat, however massive they may swell, are no match whatsoever when confronted with the united might of evil minds. Woe for the age when the might of evil mind colludes with his ego to rule the world. Hence little difference would it make whether the world were ruled by the mindless, amoral mechanism of materialism, or by the evil-minded immoral Mafia of capitalism. Yet there is a difference, and a vast difference for that matter which exposes the inadequacies and inherent flaws of Marxism. In capitalism there is always a measure of freedom which every individual of the society enjoys. It is this freedom which promotes the ultimate cause of the whole society as such. There is no freedom in Communism. An ever-increasing depression of gloominess continues to grow and penetrates every fibre of Communist society. It depresses all their potentials except in the areas where the state itself is compelled to promote them.
Another dilemma which Marxism faces is that morality cannot be defined in partisan terms. A society which is taught and trained in rejecting all moral obligations with respect to others, is very unlikely to fulfil its obligations to itself. Once given to immorality, always given to immorality, is the general pattern of human behaviour. The same applies to the Communist command system. Immorality seems to strengthen the grip of the corrupt upon the system which they operate. The more corrupt they become, the more callous and merciless they must grow to perpetuate their command.
Morality and immorality cannot be channelled exclusively in any single direction. It is not possible for the Communist hierarchy to treat the Communist world with morality, even if they so decide, while they are trained to treat the non-Communist world and non-Communist interests without the least moral obligations. This single factor was sufficient and powerful enough to bring about the downfall of the Communist dictatorship in the long run.
The popular cliché that ‘Dictatorship corrupts and absolute dictatorship corrupts absolutely’ applies perfectly to the Communist command. The immoral cannot survive without having recourse to cruelty, oppression and a blatant disregard of justice. As hatred begets hatred, so does immorality breed immorality. This state of progressive disregard of moral values at the highest level of Communist hierarchy is bound to end up in an absolutely immoral dictatorship. The absolute immoral dictatorship cannot remain confined for long within a small selective circle of their command. For their group survival, it is essential that corruption must also prevail in all adjacent levels of decision making. Thus the arid patches of immorality begin to grow bigger and wider, spreading in all planes.
However, the case of the absolute authority of a prophet of God, is vitally different from that of the mundane authorities. The prophet’s authority is confined by a strict moral religious code which even he cannot violate otherwise the very edifice of his authority would crumble. It should also be noted here that the Divinely revealed moral code is always consistent and possesses the quality of making its adherents consistent in their conduct. Hence, it is the revealed truth alone which has the potential to cure man of his intrinsic ills. No man-made code of conduct based purely on human reason can work this miracle, even when aided with merciless coercion. The main difference between secular dictators and the absolute authority of a prophet, is that while secular dictators are entirely free from any obligation to a legislative code, the prophets are strictly governed by a Divine Book of moral teachings which simultaneously and equally applies to all their followers. It is this difference which sets their roles poles apart.
Any Communist regime brought to power can never be unsaddled by the revolt of the proletariat. The power they command is total and merciless. Mercy or mere moral jargon has no place in the dictionary of Marxism. Stalin was a paragon of the Marxist amoral code of conduct. Mass murders of the proletariat themselves at the altar of Marxism, during the absolute dictatorial regime of Stalin, can be pronounced as pride of performance only from the vantage point of Communist philosophy.
Alas the genius of Marx failed to identify the inherent weakness of his dialectical materialism. The hand of Communism even if it were mightier than the furies of a desert would still not have succeeded in levelling the highs and lows of the human society.
Every stormy sea is returned to calm after the turbulent elements of nature have run their course, presenting a picture of rippleless stability. So does a vast duneless desert of sand create the illusion of perfect peace and tranquillity. The Marxists’ concept of stability and peace in the human society is closest to the scenario just presented. But little do the Marxists realize that such scenes of tranquillity in nature present no more than a picture of death. Where there is absolute levelling there is no interplay between the forces of nature, but what the Marxists also forget is the fact that the perfectly calm sea or a deathly still desert, do not share the human freedom of choice to cheat or to defraud and to create artificial ups and downs when there are no natural ups and downs left. Moreover, it is impossible for man to propose a system which can remove every element of high and low from human society. Drops of water may look alike and particles of sand may also be shaped as perfect facsimiles of each other, but humans are not made like that.
In Marxist philosophy, it is the human particles which make the Communist utopia of tranquillity. If each citizen of a Communist state is provided equal economic opportunities, each is fed with the same quantity of bread, butter and meat; if all that man lives for or desires is made available to him, exactly in accordance with his requirements, then no human vice born out of greed should ever germinate. In such an economically levelled society there seems no need left for anyone to rob, steal or cheat, or to even attempt to accommodate wealth, which would not be able to buy him anything beyond the provisions made by the state. Such a society should ultimately be rid of all crimes because greed, the most powerful causative factor of crime, would seem to have been uprooted.
When this state of equal opportunities, equal needs and equal fulfilment of needs is guaranteed, provided of course, that each member of the society puts in his share of labour to his capacity, only then the Communist dream of perfect stability could possibly come true. Such a society will need no state to govern its affairs. This, in short, is the utopia of Marx’s materialism.
The latest trends of political and economic developments in the world, however, have already exploded this materialist myth. But no outside decree is needed to destroy Marx’s garden of Eden. The rejection of morality is in itself enough to guarantee its ultimate destruction.
There are other inherent flaws in Marx’s regimentational philosophy. Apart from the fact that it provides no moral code for guiding its members to discharge their responsibilities with honesty, an emphatic denial of God and the assertion that there will be no life after death hence no accountability, emboldens the functionaries of the party to absolute indiscipline and selfishness. An utter state of selfishness ensues where no holds are barred in pursuance of one’s personal desires and ambitions. One feels free to do whatever one may to satiate one’s greed. The corrupt always gang up to protect their class interest. They can always find means to escape exposure and consequent punishment, by joining hands with others of the same ilk. Perhaps it is this inbred propensity towards selfish behaviour in man which led Marx to conclude that man is an immoral animal. But little did he realize then, that it would be the same propensity which would ultimately bring about the demolition of the Communist empire.
The rejection of morality is not the only hurdle which prevents the realization of Marx’s dream of a stateless society. Equal access to opportunities is not enough to achieve the goal of a stateless society, nor are the greeds confined only to the fulfilment of economic requirements. Where is the answer to the greed for capturing the source of power which runs supreme in every dictatorial system? Again, where is the scientific guarantee in the system for blocking the passage of jealousies, hatred and revenge in relation to the capturing of power? Marx’s scientific philosophy does not even touch this issue.
To reach the utopia, one has to pass through the hazards of a society which knows no morals and no mercy. Long before a stage of perfect levelling of economic and political society is reached, the immorality in man would have demolished the very edifice of the Communist vision of life.
In the light of this, when we reinvestigate the problems leading to the collapse of the Communist empire, we cannot fail to identify the moral failure of its functionaries to be the main culprit. It was the corruption of the Communist world which is largely to be blamed for the downfall of the Communist empire of the U.S.S.R. Thus, the failure of the system was underwritten in the Communist charter when morality was banished from it.
On the one hand there is the revealed truth and on the other, the so-called truth reached entirely through the agency of human reason. The merits of the two philosophies are not too difficult to examine. The Divine proclamation invariably claims that justice and fair play in human affairs cannot be established without their absoluteness. Moral corruption and a code of ethics based on absolute justice cannot go hand in hand. Absolute truth is the essence of all morality, and absolute morality is the essence of all truth. Hence without the rehabilitation of absolute values in man, no dream of a heaven upon earth can be envisioned. This has always been the universal pronouncement of all ages.
Marx rose to defy this age-old philosophy founded on revelation. He rejected it outright and made the counterclaim that man stands in no need of Divine guidance—nor according to him, does any God exist. Hence it is for man to carve his own path to the ultimate realization of his dream of heaven upon earth. Thus, he carved a path guided entirely by his own intellect, completely devoid of Divine guidance.
Looking at the Marxist vision of a stateless society once again, another fundamental flaw which has already been hinted at comes to light. It is assumed without foundation that if the society is economically levelled, the root cause of crime will be destroyed; hence no state power will be needed to combat crime. The greed in man, however, is certainly not limited to the area of his economic activity. Even if the objectives of Marxism are entirely achieved there is much more to the greed of man than meets the Marxist eye.
Human psyche gives birth to so many desires and ambitions that any solution proposed to solve problems without taking them into account would be inadequate. Inequalities in man are not only economic. They may belong to his physical or mental aptitudes and other faculties of head and heart. His innate desire to rule, to conquer, to govern, to dominate, to love and to be loved, are but a few areas which provide a fertile soil for the seed of greed to take root in.
Beauty is one thing that cannot be shared equally by all men and women, nor can physical fitness and health be doled out to them in equal measures. The faculties of hearing and sight, of taste and touch; the likes and dislikes, cravings and aversions, even artistic aptitudes, the taste for music and passion for art, the literary pursuits and the lack of interest in what bookworms would relish and devour, are but a few examples of variants which nature has itself produced over a long course of evolution. No proponents of scientific socialism can ever do away with them. They have to be accepted as fait accompli. The problem is that it is this diversity itself which is the ultimate root cause of all the corruption in human society. All social maladies are born out of them. The only valid solution to discipline such tendencies lies in the Divinely revealed moral codes, which in turn cannot work without the belief in God. Remove God and revealed truth from human affairs and there will be no peace left whatsoever.
This in-depth comparison between the Godless philosophy of Marxism and the belief in revealed truth serves to clarify the case in point. On the one hand there is man’s reason alone, unaided by Divine guidance, striving to resolve all human problems by itself. On the other, there is the Divinely revealed truth which emphasizes the role of absolute moral measures to combat immorality in man.
A critical review of the former leads one to the only logical conclusion, that reason by itself is totally inadequate for guiding human steps to peace and tranquillity. A study of religious history reveals that peace and tranquillity were only achieved when Divine messengers fought heroic battles against the immorality in man. It was through a course of toil, sweat and blood, that islands of a near peaceful human society were ever created in the midst of the raging ocean of crime and sin. No doubt they were always reclaimed by the seas of temptation. But even so, the level of human morality was invariably raised a notch or two. Had it not been so, and had there been no Divinely generated movements for the moral rearmament of man, society would be a hundred times worse than it is today. There is no doubt left, therefore, in the indispensability of revelation and revealed truth.
In matters of revelation and rationality, it is difficult to find many Greek philosophers fitting into the genuine description of a prophet who combines in him a perfect balance of the two. Socrates is an exception. Socrates, (470-399 BC) being a class unto himself, occupies a unique position in the history of Greek philosophy which fails to mention anyone other than him to belong to that class. There must have been prophets before and after him but of them we can only infer from some oblique references by Socrates himself. For instance, he is known to have said that he is not the only one from God who has been the recipient of revelation; there have been great men before who did the same to serve the cause of goodness. Again, he warns Athenians not to put him to death otherwise they would never see the like of him again, except if God so desires to teach the right path to the Athenians by sending someone else.
This chapter is largely devoted to Socrates and what he stood for, because he manifests a perfect balance of revelation and rationality; but it is impossible not to mention Plato and Aristotle when one talks of Greek philosophy. It is indeed they who pioneered a new mode which has become almost eternal, but they certainly owed their greatness to their revered master.
It was Socrates who had introduced into philosophical discussions of the time, the elements of knowledge, truth and rationality with emphasis so powerful that some biographers describe him as having brought high-flown ethereal philosophies from the heavens down to earth. We believe that the converse is true; the philosophical babble of the sophists before him were the acts of earthly men. It is knowledge, truth and rationality which lift human thoughts to sublime loftiness. That is why though Plato and Aristotle left a most profound and rich heritage for us concerning all philosophical discussions, there is nothing like the lasting noble influence of Socratic integrity which went largely into the making of Plato and Aristotle. The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle are but briefly dealt with, just by way of introduction.
Both Plato and Aristotle give priority to rationality in the understanding of the universal scheme of things. What is the relationship between rationality and the external world? How is knowledge attained and what is eternal truth? On these questions, the two great philosophers offer divergent views.
With Plato it is incorrect to consider the perceptions of the external world as the ultimate truth because a superficial study of any external matter is not sufficient to gain true knowledge of its inner nature. Plato believes that hidden within every external phenomenon is a deeper, invisible world of meaning that cannot be reached by mere superficial analysis.
PLATO
Plato accepts the existence of an unseen realm, governed by a Supreme Conscious Being with numerous other subordinate agents working under Him for the maintenance of the whole system of creation. However, he does not appear to believe that revelation plays any role in providing knowledge of the unknown. For him, it is through an interaction between rationality and intellectual inspiration alone that true knowledge is acquired. This interplay of intellect and inspiration can sometimes result in fascinating or even strange consequences. The outcome of this process may result in leaps of knowledge rather than step by step advancement. New ideas may be created but they are always related to the thought processes of man. Their value, according to Plato, depends on the quality and level of rationality of the perceiving mind.
For Plato, rationality demands an intensive search being carried out to penetrate into the deepest recesses of all categories of natural phenomena. By arranging the data thus gained into an intellectual orderly form, man is able to attain truth. According to him:
‘Because of the presence in him of something like a divine spark, he can, after suitable preparation, fix his intellectual gaze on the realities of the unseen world and, in the light of them, know both what is true and how to behave. He will not attain this result easily—to get to it will involve not only immense intellectual effort, including the repeated challenging of assumptions, but also turning his back on everything in life that is merely sensual or animal. Yet, despite this, the end is attainable in principle, and the man who arrives at it will exercise the most important part of himself in the best way that is open to him.’10
Thus for Plato, knowledge can be attained merely through the faculties of observation and rationality, aided sometimes by the faculty of inspiration and intuition. Truth is the knowledge gained as a result of this exercise. In short, Plato held that the apparent world is only a façade while the truth, which lies hidden behind, could be quite different from what is observed. This means that however hard we may try, we cannot completely comprehend the nature of any external fact, because all external facts or objects are constantly changing. Thus an observation made at any given time could differ from that made at another.
‘Plato held that the idea is an ideal, a non-sensible goal to which the sensible approximates; the geometer’s perfect triangle “never was on sea or land,” though all actual triangles more or less embody it. He conceived the ideas as more real than the sensible things that are their shadows and saw that the philosopher must penetrate to these invisible essences and see with the eye of his mind how they are linked together. For Plato they formed an orderly system that was at once eternal, intelligible, and good.’11
In contrast to Plato, Aristotle gives priority to the external observable reality. For him any understanding gained by man at any particular moment is to be taken as the truth. It seems as though for Aristotle the external world was itself the eternal truth. Aristotle was also persuaded of the existence of ideas towards which all the ‘various physical forms’ are moving. In sharp contrast to Plato, he perceived matter to be an independent eternal reality and presents a view of continuous evolution in which no External Conscious Being has a hand to play. He considers this evolution to be dependent only upon the natural propensities latent within matter itself.
ARISTOTLE
That should not be taken to mean that Aristotle does not believe in God, the Creator. On the contrary, he believed in a Supreme Being Who was responsible for the entire chain of cause and effect and could be referred to as the Ultimate First Cause. However, as we trace the idea of God discussed by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, we see a gradual change in relation to their concept.
Socrates seems to have a very personalized and intense relationship with the Supreme Being. His very personality is built on the pattern of the messengers of God. Plato represents the first generation of his pupils, who are also charged to a substantial degree with the Socratic spirit. In their philosophic and scientific discussions there is an inevitable stamp of spirituality. But in the transitional period, from Plato to Aristotle, we notice a perceptible decline in the idea of God playing a live and active role in the phenomena of nature. In Aristotle we do not detect any evidence that he believed in any form of communication between God and man.
Although the idea of eternal truth is not explicitly mentioned or explored in Aristotelian philosophy, an analysis of his work allows us to attribute a notion of eternal truth to him. This notion is linked to the constant motion of matter and its natural propensity to evolve towards an ideal state. According to this philosophy, matter progresses to an ideal form towards which it has always been evolving.
It becomes clear that to Aristotle, whatever one observes at any given time can be classed as a fact at that particular moment. The conclusion derived from such facts, as compiled by reason, can be called knowledge. This knowledge, when verified from different angles of observation, should be considered the truth.
Among the early philosophers Aristotle stands out because of the unbroken continuity of his influence over many an era of philosophical thought. Even today, there is no branch of philosophy which is altogether free from the influence of his dominating intellect.
We may conclude by pointing out that among most Greek philosophers, even when they believed in God, revelation was not specifically mentioned as an essential instrument for the transfer of knowledge from God to man. Rationality wedded to observation and human examination is all that is accepted as the most reliable means of gaining knowledge and truth.
This brief reference to Greek philosophy does not cover all the major Greek philosophers who have made an indelible mark on the history of human thought. The main purpose of this exercise is to present a brief review on the concept of rationality, revelation and truth, as found in the works of Greek philosophers whose words and fame have become eternal. It is here that we must introduce Socrates in his full image.
Socrates, the noblest of all Greek philosophers who presents no contradiction between his ideas and personal righteous deeds, is portrayed by many modem writers in a strange dusky light of contradiction. An outstanding moral teacher, largely seen today through the reflective mirror of Plato, Xenephon and some others of his contemporaries, Socrates is not as yet placed where he truly belongs. Of Xenephon it must be said, that being himself a believer in the polytheistic mythology of the Athenians, he was largely responsible for attributing to Socrates the belief in many gods. That is why in all that is written on Socrates today, one repeatedly finds contradictory references to him as believing in many gods as well as in One, Who is the Creator of the universe. Every fibre of his monotheist personality throbs with the life and spirit of a devotee to One God.
His belief in the Unity of God was unshakeable; his defiance of the plurality of Greek mythology was uncompromising. Virtue, knowledge, truth and eradication of all contradictions from one’s person, were the subjects of his lifelong dedication. His whole life was in itself a holy war against evil, ignorance, arrogance, and duality in man. He believed in absolute justice and answerability; he believed in life after death and the consequent punishment or reward. Readily he gave up his life with such peace of mind and tranquillity of soul, on the altar of his conviction in the Unity of God, as behoves any great prophet of God.
But that was not all that there was to his supreme sacrifice. To compromise with falsehood—even with the faintest of its shades—was not in the grain of Socrates. He would have smilingly given up his life, rejecting any unjustified pressure upon him by society to change even the smallest of his convictions under the threat of death. It is this great Greek philosopher of a prophet, who is paradoxically described as ‘the father of Western Philosophy’.
Whatever was there common between him and the philosophical pursuit of the western philosophers, is prominent only by its total absence. Virtue, humility, absolute justice, firm belief in the Unity of God, accountability of humans both here and in the hereafter can be summed up as the main body of his philosophy. Could he be the father of the philosophies of Descartes, Hegel, Engels and Marx? If so, all genetic marks of his paternal stamp must have been totally wiped out by the passage of time. Could their negation of morality be traced back to him with any sense of justice? No—certainly not.
His was a different world. His was a world of Prophets. He believed in Divinely revealed dreams; he believed in revelation; he believed in knowledge to be truth, and truth to be knowledge. He believed that no knowledge is trustworthy but that bestowed upon man by God Himself.
He was charged with the mission of delivering a Divine message to the people of Greece. To him this life was only a preparatory stage for the life to come. It was the human soul which mattered to him. It was this soul which was decreed to be delivered and transferred to the hereafter. This was his philosophy, call it Divine wisdom if you will, but certainly not a secular philosophy as portrayed by modem intellectuals.
Repeated attempts have been made to pluck him away from the comity of prophets to that of mere philosophers. Many modem writers, great as they may be in their learning, are miserably confused about his true identity. They have wasted bookfuls of material on him to try to place him where he does not belong.
Some renowned scholars have seriously attempted to remove an imaginary contradiction in him which actually did not exist. For them the contradiction was between his belief in Divine revelation and his profession of rationality. If rationality and Divine revelation ever posed a paradox, it was always posed by all the prophets of God, Socrates being no exception. Every true prophet and all the founders of great religions simultaneously believed in Divine revelation and rationality, holding fast to both with absolute tenacity. They saw no contradiction between the two. Had they seen any, true as they were, they must have rejected either the idea of God or the idea of rationality, or both perhaps. To them, the idea of rationality and God could not belong to opposite camps. Hence those who see a parallax in Socrates’ beliefs and his rationality must be suffering from diplopia themselves. Let them read Socrates once again and all that is written of him by authentic sources. They are bound to discover a new person in him who can never simultaneously be separated from his adherence to God and his rational philosophy. They must notice the fact that central to all the important material on him is his obsession that people do not pay proper attention to the importance of virtue and do not understand its real meaning.
The dilemma of contradiction 1s between the real image of Socrates and the unreal one—which is being transposed upon him—and is largely responsible for the distortion of some significant terms used in the source material. Whether one such term arete really means virtue or whether it has a secular connotation, is one of the questions which needs to be addressed. In the view of W.K.C. Guthrie:
‘We know now that the word “virtue” attaches false associations to the Greek arete, which meant primarily efficiency at a particular task.’12
It is this, according to Guthrie which jarred the sensibilities of the ‘practical’ Athenians. The word ‘practical’ reveals a glaring contradiction in Guthrie’s understanding of arete because if his definition is correct then it is Socrates who emerges to be the most practical man in Athens, not his critics: who were interested only in ‘political ability’ and ‘moral obligations’.
‘One of the things about Socrates which irritated the sensible, practical Athenian was that he would insist on turning the talk to such humble and apparently irrelevant people as shoemakers and carpenters, when what they wanted to learn about was what constituted political ability or whether there was such a thing as moral obligation.’13
It is evident from this statement that in the eyes of Guthrie, Socrates was not at all interested in ‘virtue’ as a moral term. All that he was really interested in was a common artisan’s know-how of his trade and a clear understanding of the purpose for which he was working. He must understand for instance, what a ladder stands for and to serve what purpose a ladder is to be built. This is the secular philosophy of Socrates as seen by Guthrie. The only theme which occupied him was the purpose and trade of an artisan. That is how he visualized Socrates roaming the streets of Athens, addressing the common people and teaching them how to achieve excellence in arts and crafts. He completely misses the main thrust of Socrates’ philosophy, whom he would allow no interest in virtue and piety.
One thing is certain about Socrates—whatever he indulged in was arete. So if at the same time he is condemned by society for not discussing morality it can only mean that according to them arete had no connotation of moral sense. We protest against this allegation of the author which is most certainly wrong. Athenian society never blamed Socrates for not discussing morality. Quite to the contrary, the Athenians condemned him of overmuch indulgence in his brand of morality which they considered tantamount to corrupting the youth of Athens. Thus, by ridding arete of any moral sense, Guthrie denies Socrates his status as a moral teacher. By this rather devious method he has attempted to change the facts of history. But all that he succeeds in is the creation of a parallax between an imaginary personality of Socrates, which the author himself imposes on him, and the real one that he possessed. Anyone who knows Socrates presented by the writings of Plato and some of his other contemporaries, cannot accept this baseless conjecture of the author. It is but common knowledge that what irritated Athenian society was not what the author proclaims. Socrates pleaded the Unity of God and waged a holy war against immorality. That was all the mission of Socrates and all that arete meant to him. These are the facts which must be understood in relation to the meaning of arete.
Against Guthrie, arete is rightly translated by many other scholars as ‘virtue’ with all its connotations. When Socrates talks of such small things as the nature of the instruments of arts and crafts, and the manner in which they work, and further speaks of a clearly defined purpose that every art and craft must fulfil, he is most certainly talking in cryptic terms referring all the time to humans. Otherwise he would not deny the artisans the knowledge of their own trade and would not condemn them of utter ignorance. What he in fact describes is the human ignorance to discern the nature of Divine knowledge which lies deep beneath the surface of every human occupation, yet humans remain oblivious to it. With this ignorance no human is entitled to be called human, just as an artisan is not worthy of being called an artisan if he does not possess the know-how of his trade or the purpose of building an artifact. It is to this human ignorance that Socrates strives to draw the attention of man.
It is the Divine purpose of their creation which Socrates believes humans cannot attain merely with their own efforts. They do not know how to carve their lives to suit the purpose for which they are created. Of that they know nothing, claiming all the same that they are all knowledgeable. This is what he considers to be utter ignorance. This exercise of discovering the purpose of one’s existence is what arete stands for. But this cannot be achieved without perfect humility and absolute admission of one’s ignorance. Only then is man ready to be helped by God with step by step guidance from ignorance to knowledge. The only knowledge known to Socrates is that which is revealed by Him; the rest is ignorance.
This exactly is also the message of the Quran, which attributes all knowledge to God so that even the angels admit their ignorance before him. They beseech:
… Holy art Thou! No knowledge have we except what Thou hast taught us; surely, Thou art the All Knowing, the Wise.14
The Quran repeatedly reminds humans that no knowledge of the right path can be granted them unless they profess total dependence upon Him and implore His help to guide their steps:
Thee alone do we worship and Thee alone do we implore for help. Guide us in the right path.15
It is this same lesson in humility which is so forcefully delivered by Socrates, indicating that man cannot acquire knowledge without admitting his ignorance and realizing that he needs Divine help to show him the path.
Thus, cryptically, he is alluding to man all the time while he speaks apparently of a hypothetical artisan. He sees man as suffering from the conceit that he is knowledgeable while as long as he considers himself to be knowledgeable, he cannot ever become conscious of his need to learn. This symbolism helps Socrates to fulfil his prophetic mission which was to awaken his fellow countrymen to an awareness of moral, spiritual and Divine purpose of human creation which cannot be understood or pursued without succour from Him.
Most humans move like pawns, not aware of why they move and who the Mastermind is, behind the hand that moves them. Such oblivious men can neither know their obligations to their Creator nor to their fellow human beings. To impress upon man the gravity of this situation, Socrates reminds him of life after death when he will be finally held accountable for all his deeds during his life on earth. This, the life after death, is certainly not what the secular philosophers talk about. This is the main mission and occupation of the prophets of God. We only wish that Guthrie had remembered what he himself had written about the character of Socrates in the same book. Of particular significance are the following words he claims that Socrates uttered just before his death:
‘It is probable that many, if not most, of those who disapproved of him had no wish to see him die, and would have been more than content if he could have been persuaded to leave Athens… ’16
He rejected this suggestion point blank and responded by saying:
‘ … that he had all his life enjoyed the benefits which the laws of Athens conferred on her citizens, and now that those same laws saw fit that he should die, it would be both unjust and ungrateful for him to evade their decision. Besides, who could tell that he was not going to a far better existence than that which he had known hitherto?’17
Many other highly competent scholars have also researched the true and full translation of arete. One of the most prominent among them is Gregory Vlastos who strongly rejects attempts to treat it merely as an artisan’s term. Explaining the original Greek word in its various possible connotations, he emphasizes that, in Socratic usage the word arete must be equated with piety and virtue in every form of goodness that they may refer to:
‘Any lingering doubt on this point in my readers’ mind may be resolved by referring them to the fact that whenever he brings the general concept under scrutiny—as when he debates the teachability of arete in the Protagoras and the Meno—he assumes without argument that its sole constituents or “parts” (μόρια, μέρη) are five qualities which are, incontestably, the Greek terms of moral commendation par excellence: andreia (“manliness,” “courage”), sophrosyne (“temperance,” “moderation”), dikaiosyne (“justice,” “righteousness”), hosiotes (“piety,” “holiness”), sophia (“wisdom” ).’18
Thus Vlastos is very rational in his stance that it is far more important to search aretes’ intended central meaning which Socrates himself consistently portrays and highlights.
To this intended meaning of arete another great scholar, Christopher Janaway, refers when he states that Socrates:
‘ … was concerned with questions of ethics, in particular with defining the virtues (justice, wisdom, courage, piety, temperance). This is how Socrates is portrayed by Plato in the early dialogues, and is how he makes Socrates describe himself in the Apology.’ 19
‘Central propositions in Socrates’ ethics are: virtue is knowledge; all the virtues are one; virtue is happiness …
‘Socrates also believes that no one who has knowledge of good and bad can lack any of the virtues—with such knowledge one must also be courageous, holy, temperate, and just. Finally, he thinks that the perfectly virtuous person is bound to be happier—to have greater well-being in fact—than someone who lacks virtue.’20
We fully accept Janaway’s understanding of Socrates’ ethics.
What Socrates is describing is a law which relates profoundly to human psyche and has to be accepted in its totality. The knowledge that a thorny bush could be the only safe place against a vicious beast would certainly make a sensible man accept the comparatively lesser evil of thorny pricks and, as long as he is protected, the suffering which the thorns cause will, by comparison appear to him as pleasure. While Socrates does not deny the physical suffering of a truly knowledgeable person, what he emphasizes is that whatever action is deemed suitable by a truly knowledgeable person is the only action in which he will find peace. It is as true today as it was then. It explains the optional acceptance of suffering, by godly people, in which they find happiness. For them the converse of losing God’s favour is unbearably painful. Likewise, dignified men who prefer to die in ‘pain’ rather than live in comfort by sacrificing their principles, certainly die ‘happily’ with the realization of their moral victory. They smilingly accept physical suffering rather than the spiritual disgrace which to them is far more punishing.
Vlastos has dedicated a long chapter, Socratic Piety, to resolve an imaginary contradiction in Socrates’ views and his experience. It is a scholarly yet an apologetic attempt on his part to prove that in reality no such contradiction exists. His philosophy is thoroughly rational throughout, as Vlastos sees it, but his experience of revelation and his belief in a Superior Being Who guides his life is the contradiction which must be removed. Thus, he quotes Socrates himself to bring this point home. Of his perfectly rational attitude, Socrates is known to have said:
‘Not now for the first time, but always, I am the sort of man who is persuaded by nothing in me except the proposition which appears to me to be the best when I reason (λογιζμέμῳ) about it.’21
Despite his emphasis on reason he appears to Vlastos to be a superstitious man when it comes to his personal experience. Thus he writes:
‘And yet he is also committed to obeying commands reaching him through supernatural channels.’22
To support his contention, Vlastos quotes Socrates during his trial:
‘To do this has been commanded me, as I maintain, by the god through divinations and through dreams and every other means through which divine apportionment has ever commanded anyone to do anything.’23
Having postulated this, Vlastos has written a long discourse on absolving Socrates of what he himself admits of his spiritual experience. Through an involved logic, he finally assumes that Socrates did not genuinely believe in what appears to be his personal confession. Yet despite all his scholarly effort, Vlastos fails to achieve this purpose. Read again for instance the above quoted passage by Vlastos beginning with the words
‘To do this has been commanded me, … ’24
and note that the word God used by Socrates is in the singular, yet the author prefers to write it with a small ‘g’.
This statement of Socrates, concerning his personal expenence of Divine dreams, revelations and specific commands in other forms, is so powerful and so completely at one with the universal experience of Divine prophets that it leaves no room for doubt that he means exactly what he says. A large number of Quranic verses fully support Socrates when they speak of all the prophets before the Holy Founder of Islam(sa) having shared with him all the different modes of Divine revelation.
Vlastos further builds his contradiction theory by raising the question:
‘Should this incline us to believe that Socrates is counting on two disparate avenues of knowledge about the gods, rational and extra-rational respectively, yielding two distinct systems of justified belief, one of them reached by elenctic argument, the other by divine revelation through oracles, prophetic dreams and the like?’25
One is amazed to note how imaginary contradictions can be built between what Socrates believed and what he actually experienced. He is known, of course, to have criticized the so-called Greek gods and disparaged the reliability of their revelation through oracles, but whenever he spoke of his personal experience he never ridiculed, even once, his own Divine revelation or dreams. The author has done no justice to him by adding ‘through oracles’ after ‘divine revelation’. The personal Divine revelation of which Socrates has spoken, as quoted above, has no mention whatsoever of any ‘oracles’. Invariably when he speaks of his personal experience he speaks of ‘God’ in singular, with capital G, and not of ‘gods’. When he mentions the poets’ visions, as though they were god-given, he only uses such expressions as a figure of speech, not meaning them to be actually ‘God given’:
‘Yes, what the inspired poet puts into his poem is a wonderful, god-given thing; but it isn’t knowledge—it can’t be knowledge for it is mindless.’26
His criticism that ‘it is not knowledge—it can’t be knowledge for it is mindless’, is absolutely in accordance with the common practice of poetic expressions. No doubt there is a sort of magic in some poetry as though God were speaking through the poet’s tongue, but a sensible man would not take this too seriously. For Socrates to speak of a poet as ‘god-possessed,’ may also have referred to the Athenians’ superstitious views of people being possessed by ‘gods’. Such expressions are poles apart from the language which Socrates uses for himself. He is never God-possessed but is only addressed by Him as a humble servant of His.
He makes it clear that the poetic experiences which may seem Divine are certainly not so. Whatever their import, they can at best be described as inspiration, not Divine Revelation:
‘I soon perceived that it is not through knowledge that poets produce their poems but through a sort of inborn gift and in a state of inspiration … ’27
However, the conclusion drawn by Vlastos from the same passage drives the reader out of his mind, rather than the poet he refers to as being driven ‘out of his mind’:
‘ … when the god is in him the poet is “out of his mind,” ἔκφρων … ’28
Again he absolves Socrates of irrationality by declaring:
‘Socrates has disarmed the irrationalist potential of the belief in supernatural gods communicating with human beings by supernatural signs.’29
We respectfully yet strongly disagree with him when he assumes that the same applied to Socrates’ own experiences. Only two pages after what he has concluded about the nature of the supernatural commands of others, the author has to admit that the God of Socrates was different:
‘Because, as we saw earlier, unlike their gods, Socrates’ god is invariantly good, incapable of causing any evil to anyone in any way at any time. Since to deceive a man is to do evil to him, Socrates’ god cannot be lying .’30
Further, in the same chapter, he rightly attributes a concept of worship to Socrates which was distinctly opposed to the so-called worship of the Athenians. The worship of Athenians according to him was:
‘ … an art of commercial exchanges between gods and men.’31
Their worship had to be rebuffed because they, the Athenians, make gods appear dependent on them by whatever is offered at their altar, but the God of Socrates—who is wrongly referred to as “gods” by the author:
‘ … stand in no need of gifts from us, while we are totally dependent on their gifts to us … ’32
Evidently, Socratic treatment of Athenian worship is with reference to their polytheistic godhead which may be referred to in plural, but it should be remembered here that the word ‘god’, whenever used in plural by Socrates, does not always indicate the Athenian gods which were just a product of their fancy. A careful study of Socrates reveals that by the term ‘gods’, he sometimes refers to angels or any other spiritual form of life above men and under God. However when he speaks of his own experience, he totally discards the plurality and begins to refer to one God.
‘I believe that no greater good has ever come to you in the city than this service of mine to the god.’33
(Note the singleness of God in relation to the mission bestowed to him.)
His religio-political philosophy was always at one with the universal trend of Divine teachings. No prophet of God is recorded in history to have risen in revolt against the law of the land, but when the state interfered with his obedience to God, he unhesitatingly rejected the state power without fear and followed the dictates of God.
The same was the philosophy of Socrates. He was absolutely loyal to the state but when loyalty to the state contradicted his loyalty to God, the only conclusion he drew for himself was to discard the lesser loyalty for the sake of the higher one which was due only to the Creator. Addressing the senate which was about to convict him to death, he spoke of this with unperturbed composure and dignity:
‘ … Men of Athens, I honor and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy … ’34
(Note that Jowett always writes ‘God’ with a capital ‘G’ when he relates Him to Socrates.)
When the Athenians offered him release from the death penalty on the condition that he should stop ‘corrupting’ the youth of Athens by instigating them to defy the Athenian gods and obey his own, Socrates refused them outright. There is a long discourse on this issue between him and Meletus, his chief prosecutor. During this, Meletus insists that his defiance of Athenian gods, despite his assertion that he believed in one God, is tantamount to absolute atheism and as such he must be condemned to death. Socrates’ obedience to God stood higher than his obedience to the law of Athens. He stood by it and was felled for it, but before his death delivered to the people of Athens this prophetic warning in the following words:
‘ … you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God, or lightly reject his boon by condemning me. For if you kill me you will not easily find another like me, … ’35
Having said that he goes on building the case of his innocence with incontrovertible logic, clinching the issue finally by an argument which will for ever pay tribute to his greatness. Jowett quotes him as saying:
‘ … not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of any one; they have no witness of that. And I have a witness of the truth of what I say; my poverty is a sufficient witness.’36
He also invokes his past conduct to stand witness by his side and to bear testimony to the truth of his present behaviour.
Then referring to a past incident which singled him out as the only person who dared to oppose the might of the entire senate he declared:
‘ … I cared not a straw for death, and that my only fear was the fear of doing an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong … ’37
Socrates, would not demean himself like many so called nobles in his place might have done. So he goes on to elaborate:
‘I have seen men of reputation, when they have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; … ’38
‘Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonorable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus.’39
What follows indicates that despite his unshakeable belief in Unity, he also believed in some god-like figures to whom he attributes a different and nobler sense, which does not apply to the so-called gods of Athenians. He speaks of them exactly in the same sense as ‘angels’ are referred to in other Divinely revealed religions. Thus his belief in gods in the sense of angels was certainly not contradictory to his belief in one God. When he commits his cause finally, it is not to them—the gods of Athens—that he commits it. He commits his cause to the people of Athens and to God:
‘And to you and to God I commit my cause … ’40
Even to the minutest detail, Socrates is just like any other Prophet mentioned in the Holy Quran and other scriptures. He condemned suicide as an offence against God because he treated life as His gift of which He remained the sole Master. In Phaedo, he is reported to have spoken at length with powerful arguments against the legality of suicide which he considered absolutely unpardonable. Thus, he pronounces his judgment on the issue of suicide:
‘ … there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.’41
His discourse continued until he was interrupted by Crito from whose gestures he understood that he wanted to say something. He dismissed him and all that he wanted to say on behalf of the attendant who was to administer him the poison. The attendant had suggested that if he talked too much it would weaken the effect of the poison and he would be obliged to drink it two or three times. He showed scant respect with regards to the suggestion and the discomfort which his discourses could have caused him. ‘Let him mind his business’ answered Socrates ‘and be prepared to give the poison two or three times.’
‘And now I will make answer to you, O my judges,’—here he only refers as judges to those of his admirers who had gathered around him during his last moments—‘and show that he who has lived as a true philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to receive the greatest good in the other world.’42
Thus he continued to teach the Divine philosophy to the people of Athens until he put the opiate to his lips. Even as life was slowly ebbing out, as long as he had strength to speak, he continued to discharge his Divine commission never ceasing, before death silenced him at last.
Thus came to an end the life of one of the most glorious prophets of God who lived in the fifth century BC (a contemporary of Buddha(as)). Like Buddha, he never wrote his scriptures but they were recorded by his contemporaries and committed to writing later in the form of his Dialogues. Buddha too was accused of atheism because he denied the gods of the Brahmans.
The greatest service he did to philosophy is summed up by Chambers Encyclopaedia in the following words:
‘Socrates, in bringing down philosophy from the skies to the common life of men (as Cicero put it), was only carrying out in a conspicuous and earnest way one of the new intellectual tendencies of his age.’43
‘He was indifferent to luxury and even to ordinary comfort; but he was by no means an ascetic.’44
As for the nature of his Divine Revelation, the author of the above-quoted article, states:
‘There has been much discussion about the “divine sign” (δαιμόνιον) of which Socrates used to speak as a supernatural voice which frequently gave him guidance, according to Xenophon telling him to act or not to act, according to Plato only restraining him from action, never instigating. Later writers, especially in Christian times, speak of it as a daemon, genius or attendant spirit. For this there is no authority whatever in Plato and Xenophon.’45
‘ … he seems to have had certain vivid presentiments which he took for special divine monitions; and it is possible, as has been suggested, that he was subject to occasional hallucinations of hearing, such as may occur even in quite sane and healthy persons.’46
Socrates’ revelation is thus respectfully dismissed as hallucination.
In reality, there is no contradiction in Socrates. Whatever contradiction there is, has to be in the mind of the author who apparently defended Socrates by suggesting that his hallucinations were not all that bad as those of psychic people suffering from mental aberrations. Hallucinations can also sometimes be experienced by sane healthy persons as in the case of Socrates.
What sympathy, what a condescending attitude to Socrates by some modem writer who has faith in Socrates but has no faith in his belief in God. However condescending that remark may be, it is no tribute to the greatness of Socrates who does not stand in need of any apology. Did not the same misfortune befall all the prophets of God before or after him? Each of them was accused of hallucination by the society he addressed though not as politely as the author of the said article has treated Socrates. All such accusers knew full well that the prophets they accused of such mental aberrations were neither frail in mind nor weak of moral health. They were the wisest people of their time, sound of head and heart, respected as such by the society in which they grew from the age of their childhood to that of full maturity. None of them is accused of behaving in any manner like a soothsayer prior to their claim to prophethood; none is ever reported even after that to act as though he were hallucinating. Hallucinations are always unpredictable, disjointed and incoherent. The voices that some hallucinators hear do seem to address them as though they were from God but they never reveal to them any philosophy or way of life which can be shared and practised by others. There is no logic in what they hear and no logic in what they say. Hallucinations never give birth to rationality.
To mix up hallucination with prophecy is but a morbid attempt to discredit Divine revelation. The experience of the prophets of God is essentially different! Truth, wisdom and rationality are their distinctive features while the hostile society they confront symbolizes dogma, falsehood and superstition. The message that the prophets deliver is always based on sound moral code. They breathe wisdom, they exude piety, they advocate rationality, they preach morality, justice, moderation, understanding, kindness, patience, service and sacrifice. Is this the prophetic message delivered to them during their maddest moments of ‘hallucination’? What hallucination indeed! One only wishes that their accusers had remembered their own hallucinatory experiences while they were stricken, for instance, by a severe attack of septic fever or typhoid. Do they ever remember a wise code of life bestowed upon them during those temporary derangements which could stand the test of time and deliver a new message to mankind to be taken seriously by them?
Rationality and hallucination never cohabit healthy minds. How we wish that whoever accused him of hallucination had further elaborated his statement by quoting from his own experience. Had a sane person ever learnt an exceptionally sound philosophy of life through his occasional outbursts of delusion? How we wish the author had remembered that all the wisdom and all the piety and all the rationality and faith, which Socrates displayed, he had learnt from the so-called voices of his ‘hallucination’! If his faith in revelation is to be rejected as based on hallucination, then all his philosophy of life, and all his wisdom must also be rejected by the same token. He can never be separated from his rationality.
We accept the whole of Socrates. Noble was his character, noble his vision, noble was the life he led. Such as he are never forged by hallucinations. Peace was with him when he was born, peace was with him while he lived, peace was with him when he died smilingly—while the throng of his admirers bitterly wailed and cried and sobbed around him. Athens had never seen the departure of a soul as noble as that of Socrates.
Allah be pleased with him! May He shower His choicest blessings upon him; but woe to his murderers. Athens will never see the like of him again!
1 WESTFALL, R.C. (1993) The Life of Issac Newton. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 124
2 WESTFALL, R.C. (1993) The Life of Issac Newton. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 122
3 WESTFALL, R.C. (1993) The Life of Issac Newton. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 121
4 WESTFALL, R.C. (1993) The Life of Issac Newton. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 121
5 GUTMAN, J. (1963) Philosophy A to Z. Grosset & Dunlap Inc, New York.
6 KIERNAN, T. (1966) Who’s Who In The History of Philosophy. Vision Press, New York, p. 54
7 COPLESTON, F. (1956) Contemporary Philosophy. Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism. Burns, Oates and Washboume Ltd., London, pp. 154-155
8 SARTRE, J. (1975) Existentialism and Humanism. Eyre Methuen Ltd., London, p. 34
9 LENIN, v, 1. (1963) Collected Works. Vol. 38, Philosophical Notebooks. Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, p. 201
10 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. 24, 15th ed.
11 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. 25, 15th ed.
12 GUTHRIE, W.K.C. (1950) The Greek Philosophers. Methuen & Co, p. 72
13 GUTHRIE, W.K.C. (1950) The Greek Philosophers. Methuen & Co, p. 72
14 Translation of 2:33 by Maulawi Sher Ali.
15 Translation of 1:5-6 by Maulawi Sher Ali.
16 GUTHRIE, W.K.C. (1950) The Greek Philosophers. Methuen & Co, p. 79
17 GUTHRIE, W.K.C. (1950) The Greek Philosophers. Methuen & Co, p. 79
18 VLASTOS, G. ( 1991) Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 200
19 GRAYLING, A.C. (1995) Philosophy - A Guide Through The Subject. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 360
20 GRAYLING, A.C. (1995) Philosophy - A Guide Through The Subject. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 364
21 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 157
22 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 157
23 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 157
24 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 157
25 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 167
26 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 168
27 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 169
28 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 169
29 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 170-171
30 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 173
31 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 174
32 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 174
33 VLASTOS, G. (1991) Socrates, Jronist and Moral Philosopher. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 175
34 JOWETT, B. (1989) Plato, The Republic And Other Works. Anchor Press, New York, p. 459
35 JOWETT, B. (1989) Plato, The Republic And Other Works. Anchor Press, New York, pp. 460-461
36 JOWETT, B. (1989) Plato, The Republic And Other Works. Anchor Press, New York, pp. 460-461
37 JOWETT, B. (1989) Plato, The Republic And Other Works. Anchor Press, New York, p. 462
38 JOWETT, B. (1989) Plato, The Republic And Other Works. Anchor Press, New York, p. 464
39 JOWETT, B. (1989) Plato, The Republic And Other Works. Anchor Press, New York, p. 464
40 JOWETT, B. (1989) Plato, The Republic And Other Works. Anchor Press, New York, pp. 464-465
41 JOWETT, B. (1989) Plato, The Republic And Other Works. Anchor Press, New York, pp. 493-494
42 JOWETT, B. (1989) Plato, The Republic And Other Works. Anchor Press, New York, p. 495
43 Chambers Encyclopaedia (1970) New Revised Edition Volume XII Roskilde-Spahi. International Leaming Systems Corporation Limited, London, p. 673
44 Chambers Encyclopaedia (1970) New Revised Edition Volume XII Roskilde-Spahi. International Leaming Systems Corporation Limited, London, p. 673
45 Chambers Encyclopaedia (1970) New Revised Edition Volume XII Roskilde-Spahi. International Leaming Systems Corporation Limited, London, p. 673
46 Chambers Encyclopaedia (1970) New Revised Edition Volume XII Roskilde-Spahi. International Leaming Systems Corporation Limited, London, p. 673