The Alleged Utility of Juridical Stipulations About Dhimmis

It is interesting to note that the Jurists who framed these anti-Dhimmi rules have offered justifications for these rules which are simply amazing. For instance, according to these jurists, such restrictions are necessary in order to expose the Dhimmis to humiliation and emphasize their impotence. This would protect the weak Muslims. Also, according to them, the Dhimmis must be disgraced, as much as the Muslims have to be honoured. Therefore it is, that if there is no mark of distinction between the Muslim and Non-Muslims, there is every possibility that a Dhimmi might be confused with a Muslim and honoured and respected like him which according to them is dangerously illegal. Hence the necessity of such distinctions. But care should be taken to see that these restrictions and marks lower rather than enhance the self-respect of Dhimmis. Because political expediency demands that these people are kept weak and suppressed.1

Some apologists have tried to justify the imposition of such restrictions on the ground that it was meant to promote the interest of the Dhimmis themselves. It was actually, they say, a protective measure for the safeguard of their culture and civilization. Such marks of distinction, for example, would help the Muslims recognize the Dhimmis more readily and this according to them held the hands of the ordinary Muslims and obviated the chances of clash against the Dhimmis. It is clear that justifications of this trend can satisfy only those modern imperialists of East and West who try to prove that their colonial strongholds in Asia and Africa are meant purely to serve the People of these countries, to confer on them the blessings of learning and knowledge, to civilize them and ultimately to enable them to take over the reins of power.

Some people try to save face by saying that such oppressive measures were proposed by irresponsible and unauthentic people or that they have been handed down to us by not very reliable quarters. To us, this answer, too, holds no water, because the details reproduced above have been taken from standard works of Islamic jurisprudence. For instance, Hidayah is one of the most famous books of Fiqah2 and one of the basic ones, too. It is part of recognized syllabus on Fiqah and accepted by almost all the centers of Islamic learning throughout the Islamic world. Its commentary فتح القدیر (Fathul-Qadir) was written by no less an expert on Islamic law than Abu Hammam. Similarly بحر الدقائق (Bahrud-Daqa’iq) a commentary of کنز الدقائق (Kanzud-Daqa’iq) is a standard work, بداء الضاء (Bada’ud-Da’) is also an authoritative work of Hanifite school of Fiqah. ‘Aini’s commentary of کنز الدقائق (Kanzud-Daqa’iq) and Fatawa Shara‘i are equally authoritative works.

And who can doubt the authenticity of Imam Novi’s commentary of Sahih Muslim. Similarly الَختيار اتالعلميہ (Al-Ikhtiyaratul-‘Ilmiyyah) has been compiled by the famous Imam Ibn-e-Taimiyyah. In short, all works that have been quoted above are standard and authentic. In their day all these books have been important sources of governmental policy.

It must not, however, be misunderstood that the views expressed by these authors have Islamic sanction at their back. We merely want to point out that these details in fact exist in books on Islamic jurisprudence. Again it should be clearly understood that these rules were not always followed by the Muslim governments. As a matter of fact in spite of these ridiculous sanctions, Muslims and their governments generally, were very generous towards the Dhimmi citizens in keeping with the true spirit of Islam. This had been admitted by the non-Muslims themselves. The famous Christian historian Jurjy Zaidan who is well-known for his hostility against Muslims, writes:

"One of the important causes of the rapid scientific advancement by the Muslims was that Muslim caliphs encouraged and honoured scholars and scientists irrespective of their nationality and religion. They were famous for bestowing huge rewards and honours on them. Differences of religion, nationality and race were not even thought of Christians, Jew, Sabians, Sumarians, Majosites, all were equally favoured and respected by the caliphs. The non-Muslims enjoyed the same rights to freedom and status as did the Muslim nobles and high officials."3

Again when the repeated violation of treaties and border trespasses by the Roman Qaiser’s armies had taxed caliph Haroon’s patience to its limits, one day he angrily demanded the chief justice Imam Abu Yusuf as to why in spite of all these violations the Christians remained safe under the Muslims and who allowed them to take out open processions of Cross in the cities. At this Imam Abu Yusuf with great courage and calmness replied: "When these countries were conquered in the days of Hazrat ‘Umar (ra), (the second Khalifah of the Holy Prophet (sas) it was guaranteed to the Christians that their churches will remain inviolate and that they shall have full freedom to religious observances and take out processions of cross openly. Therefore no one has the right to cancel this order which relates to basic human rights."4

Similarly writing about the Muslim rule in Spain the author of the History of Spain, Louis Bertrand, says:

"The Christians were left masters of it. They retained their estates, together with timber, dwellings, and all movable property; and they retained also, the right of sale."5

These facts bear out that even after the days of the pious Caliphate the Muslim governments’ attitude towards their non-Muslim citizens, to say the least, was full of affection and regard and was based on the principles of equality and Justice. They, in fact, paid scant respect to these legalistic innovations of jurists. It is not, however, denied that when a corrupt ruler was guilty of trespass against the rights of Dhimmi citizens, in order to fulfil his ulterior designs, he tried to justify his excesses by basing them on such juridical monstrosities, and gave excesses by basing them on such juridical monstrosities, and gave the non-Muslim critics an opportunity to criticize Islam.


1 Hidayah, Vol. II, Kitabus-Siyar, p. 600. (Cairo 2008)

Bahrur-Ra’iq Sharah Kanzud-Daqa’iq, Vol. V, p. 113. (Maktabah Majdiyyah Quetta)

Badai‘us-Sana’i‘, Vol. VII, Kitabus-Siyar, p. 113. (Maktabah Rashid Quetta 1990)

2 Islamic jurisprudence.

3 Tarikh-e-Tamaddunal-Islami, Vol. III, p. 180. (Maktabatul-Hayat, Beirut)

4 Al-Harun, p. 284.

5 The History of Spain by Louis Bertrand, Part I, p. 32.